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ABSTRACT 
 
The interplay between political risk and emerging markets is current and dynamic. As global 
interest shifts, investors cannot ignore emerging market behaviour and their influence. 
However, with great potential and opportunities, too comes great political risk. This research 
study begins with the point raised by the Eurasia Group that emerging market risk differs to 
that of developed market risk, and that risk in some instances can be ‗unbounded‘. 
Subsequently, the Eurasia Group deems emerging markets a top risk for 2013. Focussing on 
the oil and gas industry in emerging markets, Nigeria and Mexico offer valuable case studies. 
This research study offers a comparative study of these two countries in order to determine a 
generic list of political risk factors that are facing the oil and gas industries in emerging 
markets. In an increasingly volatile world, with a growing global demand for energy sources, 
and greater uncertainty surrounding investments and potential returns, political risk analysis is 
an invaluable decision-making tool for Transnational Oil Corporations (TNOCs) in order for 
their assets and interests to be protected.  
The central research question concerns the main political risk factors facing investors who 
want to participate in the oil and gas industry in emerging markets. The aim of the research 
study is to answer the central research question through the help of supplementary questions. 
The first of these ask what the main political risk factors for TNOCs operating in the Niger 
Delta are. The second question asks what the main political risk factors for TNOCs operating 
in the Gulf of Mexico are. So as to complete the political risk picture, the last question asks 
how political risk in the oil and gas industry can be mitigated. This research study will 
contribute to existing research, and will assist investors with risk identification, analysis and 
mitigation. By utilising the generic list of essential political risk factors, TNOCs are made 
aware of the most salient political risks in the oil and gas industry in emerging markets, and 
therefore are better placed to make rational and informed decisions when it comes to foreign 
investment.  
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OPSOMMING 
 
Die wisselwerking tussen politieke risiko en opkomende markte is intyd en dinamies. Soos 
globale belange verskuif, kan beleggers nie die opkomende markte se gedrag en invloed 
ignoreer nie, alhoewel met groot potensiaal en geleenthede kom daar ook groot politieke 
risiko. Die navorsingstudie het begin met die Eurasia Groep wat uitgelig het dat opkomende 
markrisiko verskil van die van ‘n ontwikkelde mark en dat die risiko in sekere gevalle 
―ongebonde‖ kan wees.  Gevolglik is opkomende markte as ‘n top risiko vir 2013 
geklassifiseer. Met ‘n fokus op die olie- en gasindustrie in opkomende markte, bied Nigerië 
en Mexiko waardevolle gevallestudies. Die navorsingstuk bied ‘n vergelykende studie van dié 
twee lande met die doel om ‘n generiese lys van politieke risikofaktore wat die olie- en 
gasindustrie in opkomende markte in die gesig staar, vas te stel. In ‘n toenemende onstabiele 
wêreld met ‘n toenemende globale aanvraag vir energiebronne en groter onsekerheid rakende 
beleggings en potensiële opbrengs, is politieke risiko-analise ‘n waardevolle besluitnemings-
meganisme vir Trans-Nasionale Oliekorporasies (TNOKs) om hul bates en belange te 
beskerm.  
Die sentrale navorsingsvraag fokus op die hoof politieke risikofaktore vir beleggers wat in die 
olie- en gasindustrie van opkomende markte wil belê.  Die doel van die navorsingstudie is om 
die sentrale navorsingsvraag te beantwoord met behulp van aanvullende vrae. Die eerste vraag 
raak die hoof politieke risikofaktore vir TNOKs aan wat in die Niger-Delta opereer. Die 
tweede vraag handel oor die hoof politieke risikofaktore vir TNOKs wat in die Golf van 
Mexiko opereer. Die laaste vraag voltooi die politiese risiko profiel deur te vra hoe die 
politieke risiko in die olie- en gasindustrie verminder kan word. Die navorsingstudie sal 
bestaande navorsing aanvul en beleggers help om risiko‘s te identifiseer, analiseer en 
verminder. Deur ‘n generiese lys van politieke risikofaktore te gebruik, word TNOKs bewus 
gemaak van die mees prominente politieke risiko‘s in die olie- en gasindustrie van 
opkomende markte, wat hulle in staat stel om rasionele en ingeligte besluite te neem wanneer 
dit by internasionale beleggings kom.  
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH STUDY 
1.1 Background to the study 
Emerging markets have been deemed by the Eurasia Group
1
 to be a top risk for 2013. ―It is 
critical to understand that emerging market downside differs wildly from country to country, 
and in many of them, in stark contrast to developed markets, that risk is ‗unbounded‘‖ 
(Eurasia Group, 2013b). The Eurasia Group identified ten risks for 2013 in their ‗Top Risks 
2013‘ report. They were: emerging markets, China versus information, Arab Summer, 
Washington politics, JIBs (Japan, Israel, Britain), Europe, East Asian Geopolitics, Iran, India 
and lastly, South Africa. The Eurasia Group sees political risk as having emerged once again 
with recent events spurring it on such as the global recession, the ensuing Eurozone crisis, the 
conflict in the Middle East, and East Asian geopolitics (Eurasia Group, 2013b). ―Politics has 
come to dominate market outcomes around the world…Economic statecraft is a key 
component of global foreign policy. State capitalism is a principle challenge to the free 
market‖ (Eurasia Group, 2013b).  
Political risk is a dynamic and complex phenomenon. Literature first emerged after the 1973 
oil crisis, and interest increased after the Falklands crisis between Argentina and Britain, 
along with the war between Iran and Iraq (Fitzpatrick, 1983:249). Interest in political risk 
however waned near the end of the Cold War (Brink, 2004:3). It is cyclical in its prominence 
and has an ever-expanding nature. Political risk analysis is generally understood as 
―governmental or societal actions or policies, originating either within or outside the host 
country, and negatively affecting either a select group of, or the majority of, foreign business 
operations and investments‖ (Simon, 1982:68). When looking at political risk analysis 
through a foreign investment lens, Hough (2008:6) provides the following definition, ―the 
analysis of the probability that factors caused or influenced by the (in)actions or reactions of 
stakeholders within a political system to events outside or within a country, will affect 
investment and business climates in such a way that investors will lose money or not make as 
much money as expected when the initial decision to invest was made‖.  
Globalisation has led to a changing and complex environment in which global affairs operate. 
―In no area is political risk more relevant than in analysis of globalisation and the rapid 
growth of emerging markets‖ (Bremmer & Keat, 2009:68). Radiating from globalisation has 
been the increased movement of money, goods, services, ideas and people. With economic 
                                                          
1
 The Eurasia Group is considered to be one of the world‘s leading political risk consulting firms (Eurasia Group, 
2013a) 
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growth and investment in foreign countries, came ―increased uncertainty and the salience of 
non-traditional business and societal risks such as terrorism, corruption, climate change and 
global warming…and these have not only increased the awareness of risk in a complex 
environment, but have also increased the demand for risk analysis‖ (Hough, Du Plessis & 
Kruys, 2008:6). The way nations interact and the expanding global economy has led to an 
increasing need to consider risks (Brink, 2004:3; Alon, Gurumoorthy, Mitchell, & Steen. 
2006:623). Emerging markets are ―those countries where politics matters at least as much as 
economics to market outcomes‖ (Eurasia Group, 2013b). The rise in literature and focus on 
emerging markets has highlighted both the political and economic spheres of such countries, 
and as such, economics comes to take its role alongside the political and ―geo-economics now 
sits alongside geopolitics in matters of war, peace, and prosperity‖ (Eurasia Group, 2013b).  
Emerging markets have until recently been perceived as a positive occurrence, accounting for 
growth and increased trade and investment. Since the global recession
2
, which occurred after 
the 2007 financial crisis
3
, emerging markets appeared stronger and more resilient to economic 
crisis, when compared with certain developed nations, like those in Europe. Economic 
momentum during the recession has meant that emerging markets have been applauded for 
their growth; however, one must remember that emerging market nations too can experience 
instability and volatility. As such, ―we have to stop treating emerging markets as an asset 
class for outsized growth and instead consider which developing country governments have 
enough political capital to remain on track toward a more advanced stage of development‖ 
(Eurasia Group, 2013b). This presents scope when assessing the political risk that may arise 
in emerging markets across the world. The growth in foreign investment and commerce has 
meant that the risks involved in such undertakings have grown too. These risks are not only 
economic or social, but also political (Alon & Herbert, 2009:127). 
Two examples of emerging markets are Nigeria and Mexico (O‘Neill, 2011). Nigeria is 
situated in West Africa and is the most populated country in Africa, accounting for more than 
20% of the continent‘s population. Nigeria is an oil-rich country, and as such has an oil-
dependent political economy. A vital part of Nigeria‘s economic growth lies in its resource 
wealth, specifically in its oil and gas reserves (Omeje, 2006:1). However, Nigeria has long 
been considered unstable by investors, having to contend with corruption and conflict 
surrounding its oil industry (Frynas & Mellahi, 2003:548). Mexico is situated in North 
                                                          
2
 Global recession is a period of economic decline, notably economic slowdown for two or more consecutive 
quarters (IMF, 2009).  
3
 The 2007 financial crisis began in the United States due to causes such as the bursting of the property bubble, 
bank fragility, deregulation, and availability of finance (Gamble, 2009:6). 
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America and is the fifth largest country in the Americas. It has a free-market economy, and 
with regards to the oil and gas industry, it is the ninth largest oil producer in the world and is 
the third largest in the Western hemisphere. Oil is a crucial sector for the economy, forming 
16% of export earnings and 34% of total government revenue (Energy Information 
Administration (EIA), 2012a:1).  Nigeria and Mexico have been selected as cases for this 
study, and why they are deemed adequate will be explained later in this chapter.  
Extractive industries are lucrative, especially the oil and gas industry, and as such are valuable 
to emerging market countries as they can be huge drivers for economic growth. However, 
these industries also face increased political risk. ―Industries of strategic importance – such as 
natural resources, banking, finance, and utilities and insurance – are more likely to be 
regulated than are industries of minor strategic importance, and thus face greater political 
risk‖ (Alon & Herbert, 2009:129).  
Oil and gas exploration had previously been done in politically safe areas and this left much 
of the developing world yet to fully be explored (Lax, 1983:46). There are opportunities for 
Transnational Oil Corporations (TNOCs) to explore new areas, some of these being in 
emerging markets. In these areas there may be higher political risk; however, investing here 
could lead to high rewards. The TNOC could have the opportunity of capturing early market 
share, but they will need to decide how much risk they are willing to accept. The oil and gas 
industry and the wealth gained from it can aid governments in development and economic 
growth, and consequently the extractive industry becomes a concern for national governments 
and is more sensitive to political events. With increased control by host countries, comes a 
decrease in the importance of TNOCs, and the political risk within the industry rises. ―As a 
logical correlation to the amount and intensity of political activity that has been focused on 
oil, the attendant political risks confronted by oil companies have been particularly high‖ 
(Lax, 1983:6). 
1.2 Preliminary Literature review  
This research project will focus on four avenues of observation; political risk, emerging 
markets, Nigeria and Mexico and their oil and gas industries, and lastly mitigation of political 
risk. Political risk is a complex and wide-ranging subject and there is a great deal of literature 
which encompasses its many different sides. The main texts examined provide a clear 
understanding of political risk and taken together, form the theoretical and conceptual 
foundation of the research study. The main texts include, Brink‘s (2004) Measuring Political 
Risk: Risks to Foreign Investment, Hough‘s (2008) An Introductory Context of the 
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Methodological, Conceptual, and Theoretical Framework of Risk Analysis, which provides a 
good conceptualisation as well as a discussion on the different frameworks for political risk 
analysis. Further texts include, Bremmer and Keat‘s (2009) The Fat Tail: The Power of 
Political Knowledge for Strategic Investing, Kobrin‘s (1978) When does Political Instability 
Result in increased Investment Risk?, and Lambrechts, Weldon & Boshoff‘s (2011) Political 
Insecurity and the Extraction Industry in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Moving towards 
an Industry Specific Political-security Risk Analysis Model. Other authors include Simon 
(1984), Frei & Ruloff (1988), Bischoff & Lambrechts (2010), Howell & Chaddick (1994), 
Hough (2008), Lax (1983), Tarzi (1992), Venter (1998), and Robock (1971). 
Political risk is increasing in importance, and as such, companies need to ensure they take the 
right steps towards being able to forecast risk as well as having plans in place should such risk 
arise. According to Diamonte, Liew and Stevens (1996:71), political risk represents ―a more 
important determinant of stock returns in emerging than in developed markets‖. In their study 
however, they found political risk in emerging markets to be decreasing, while over a decade 
later with the launch of the latest Eurasia Group ‗Top Risks 2013‘ report, emerging market 
risk is on the rise once again. Political risk is about understanding that, ―governments and 
businesses have different expectations and goals. To operate a global business successfully, 
you need to understand what motivates government action, particularly in places where 
politics matter at least as much as economics to market outcomes‖ (Eurasia Group, 2013b). 
Emerging markets have grown in stature, accounting for two-thirds of the world‘s growth. 
Bremmer and the Eurasia Group have conducted a great deal of research on emerging markets 
and their role in the global sphere. Further literature on emerging markets includes Khanna & 
Palepu‘s (2010) Winning in Emerging Markets: A Road Map for Strategy and Execution, 
Kvint‘s (1999) The Global Emerging Market in Transition, as well as other authors such as 
van Agtmael (2008) and O‘Neill (2011). 
This research study will look at industry-specific risk, focussing on the oil and gas industry. 
Some of the main texts relating to industry-specific risk include, Alon et al’s. (2006) 
Managing Micropolitical risk: A Cross-Sector Examination, Berlin et al’s. (2003) Managing 
Political Risk in the Oil and Gas Industries, Lax‘s (1983) Political Risk in the International 
Oil and Gas industry, and Frynas and Mellahi‘s (2003) Political risks as Firm Specific 
(Dis)advantages: Evidence on Transnational Oil Firms in Nigeria.  
This research study aims to look at political risk in the oil and gas industry in emerging 
markets and the selected case studies are Nigeria and Mexico. The oil and gas industry in the 
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Niger Delta will be the focus regarding Nigeria, while the oil and gas industry in the Gulf of 
Mexico will be the focus regarding Mexico. There is a great amount of literature on Nigeria, 
specifically surrounding the oil and gas industry. Texts will include Obi and Rustad‘s (2010) 
Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta – Managing the Complex Politics of Petro-Violence, 
Watts‘ (2007) Petro-Insurgency or Criminal Syndicate? Conflict & Violence in the Niger 
Delta, El-Choueiry, Feather, Jeffrey & Shaw‘s (2013) Federal Republic of Nigeria: Risk 
Assessment Report, Bischoff & Lambrechts‘ (2010) The Regional Impact of Political Risk: 
The Conflict in the Niger Delta and the Political Risk of the Gulf of Guinea, Ebohon‘s (2010) 
Nigeria: State, Oil and Malignant Underdevelopment, and Peel‘s (2009), A swamp full of 
dollars: Pipelines and paramilitaries at Nigeria’s Oil Frontier.  The oil and gas industry 
forms an integral part of Mexico‘s economy and its growth. Literature on Mexico will 
include; Hamnett‘s (1999) A Concise History of Mexico, Trotta & Hughes‘ (2012) Key 
Political Risks to watch in Mexico, OSAC‘s (2013) Mexico Crime and Safety Report, The 
Energy Information Administration‘s (2012) Report on Mexico’s oil and gas industry, BBC 
News‘ (2013) Mexico Profile, Kerner & Hernandez‘s (2013) Mexico Moves Toward a Major 
Energy Reform, and Harary Security Consulting International‘ (2013) Mexico’s annual 
Security Review for 2012. Further authors include; Schtulmann (2013), Snow (2013), 
Thomson (2012), Harrup & Luhnow (2011) and Khan (2013).  
To conclude, the research study will also briefly look at risk management and mitigation as it 
is a vital step in a political risk analysis and ―risk management is of paramount importance to 
the economic consequences of investments in the oil and gas industry‖ (Berlin et al., 2003:1). 
The main texts here will consist of; Berlin et al’s. (2003) Managing Political Risk in the oil 
and gas Industries, Riordan‘s (2007) Mitigating Emerging-Markets Risks in mining 
operations, Alon et al’s. (2006) Managing Micropolitical Risk: A Cross-Sector Examination, 
Hough‘s (2008) An Introductory Context of the Methodological, Conceptual, and Theoretical 
Framework of Risk Analysis, and World Risk Review‘s (2013) Identifying and Managing 
Political Risk in Pipeline Project. Further authors include; Brink (2004), Wood (2009) and 
Lax (1983). 
1.3 Research problem  
The interplay between political risk and emerging markets is current and dynamic. Emerging 
markets are becoming increasingly important and as global interest shifts, investors cannot 
ignore emerging market behaviour and their influence, as in ―a G-Zero world, with an absence 
of global leadership and geopolitics very much ‗in play‘, everyone will face more volatility‖ 
(Eurasia Group, 2013b). 
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Firms can reduce uncertainty and be made aware of risks and as such, ways can be found in 
which to manage and mitigate it. It has become increasingly important to accurately measure 
political risk for emerging markets. Brink (2004:4) succinctly puts it: 
―There is and always has been a relationship between politics and business that affects 
investment, and understanding that relationship better aids in understanding the political risk 
involved when investing. By undertaking this research study, the nature and extent of the 
political risk involved can be determined, and therefore risks can actually be exploited and 
even possibly profited from depending on the degree to which an investor is either risk averse 
or risk assertive‖. 
The focus of this study is accordingly to discover essential generic political risk factors, 
which will enable businesses to think about investment in the oil and gas industry in 
emerging markets, in a clearer manner. TNOC investors need to be made aware of the 
political risks in emerging markets, in order for the firms to be able to mitigate and 
manage such risks, and in doing so protect their assets and interests.  
Accordingly, the main research question that will drive this research study is: What are the 
main political risk factors facing investors who want to participate in the oil and gas industry 
in emerging markets? The independent variables are the main political risk factors and the 
dependent variable is the oil and gas industry in emerging markets.  
The following two sub-questions will aid in the answering of the main research question: 
‘What are the main political risk factors for TNOCs operating in the Niger Delta’ and ‘what 
are the main political risk factors for TNOCs operating in the Gulf of Mexico?’ The third sub-
question looks at the final aspect of risk analysis that investors need to look at, which is: ‗How 
can political risk in the oil and gas industry be mitigated?’  
1.4 Objectives and relevance of the research study 
The aim of research is a ―systematic inquiry designed to further our knowledge and 
understanding of a subject‖ (Smyth & Robinson, 2001:110). For this research study, the first 
aim is to discover the links between political risk and emerging markets, determining the 
main political risk factors facing investors who want to participate in the oil and gas industry 
in emerging markets. This enables the second aim to be looked at, enhancing a TNOCs 
capacity for risk management and mitigation in the oil and gas industry in emerging markets, 
as ―knowing tomorrow is not sufficient; determining how tomorrow will affect operations, 
profits, and other corporate concerns is the key‖ (Lax, 1983:110). This research study will 
therefore assist with political risk identification, analysis and mitigation. 
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The relevance of this research study is found when looking at the Eurasia Group‘s ‗Top Risks 
2013‘ report. Number one on their list was ‗emerging markets‘, which they state will witness 
more volatility and instability than the advanced industrialised democracies in 2013. The risk 
emerging markets present, according to the Eurasia Group, is ‗unbounded‘. Along with this, 
in 2005, Jim O‘Neill, the Chairman of Goldman Sachs4 Asset Management identified ―the 
Next 11 largest populations after BRIC‖5, which, ―combined with economic and political 
conditions—could greatly impact the global economy‖ (Goldman Sachs, 2013b). The N-11 
countries are Vietnam, South Korea, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, 
Philippines, Turkey and Nigeria (O‘Neill, 2011).  
Emerging economies, with their dynamism and size are attractive to investors. Added to this 
has been the global increase in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and the integration of 
markets globally (Alon et al., 2006:623.) As such, it becomes pertinent to explore TNOC 
investment and the political risks involved in such an exercise.  
The focus on the oil and gas industry is relevant due to the geo-political location of oil 
reserves (Berlin et al., 2003:2) and the risks geo-politics bring. Furthermore, in the emerging 
markets, Nigeria and Mexico, the oil and gas industry plays a fundamental role in economic 
growth. The focus on industry-specific political risk is relevant, as rather than political risk 
being evaluated on a general scale, it ―should be construed as being primarily a firm-specific 
or project-specific value assessment‖ (Frynas & Mellahi, 2003:546), in order to conduct a 
more comprehensive risk assessment. Political events will impact certain industries and firms 
differently, and each industry and firm has different resources and capabilities to deal with 
political risks. While macro risk is seen to be dramatic, micro risks are more prevalent as well 
as manageable. Micro political risk analysis within specific industries holds great relevance, 
as ―the nature and scope of political risk changes with respect to the specific time, home and 
host countries and organisations involved‖ (Alon et al., 2006:626), and thus micro political 
risk becomes more important for companies to gauge (Robock, 1971:10).   
                                                          
4
 Goldman Sachs is a multinational investment banking firm based in America (Goldman Sachs, 2013a). 
5
 BRIC consist of Brazil, Russia, India and China, and are seen to be the world‘s emerging economies. The 
acronym was coined by Jim O‘Neill in 2001. O‘Neill of Goldman Sachs stated that the BRIC countries would 
play an increasingly larger global role (Goldman Sachs, 2013b). The use of the term ‗BRIC‘ is done so 
intentionally and should not be mistaken with the term ‗BRICS‘. O‘Neill, who coined the term ‗BRIC‘, did not 
agree when South Africa was added to the grouping acronym (Spector, 2011). Accordingly, his point of 
reference remains ‗BRIC‘. O‘Neill also came up with the N-11 and it was from this list of emerging markets that 
the case studies for this research study were chosen. 
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1.5 Research design and research methodology 
As this research study focuses on political risk in the oil and gas industry in emerging 
markets, the underlying theory will be that of problem solving and decision making. Decision 
making theory is a theory ―underlying rational decision-making under uncertainty‖ (Brink, 
2004:30). The methodology used in this research study will predominantly be qualitative. 
Studies of a qualitative nature are flexible in their approach and have the ability to include 
new ideas while gathering data (Kumar, 2011:225).  It will be inductive, in that it will begin 
by ―observing the empirical world and then reflecting on what is taking place…moving 
towards theoretical concepts and propositions‖ (Neuman, 2006:60). Data will predominantly 
be of a secondary nature. Academic books and journals will be sourced from the University of 
Stellenbosch library, as well as reputable sources gathered from the internet. Some primary 
data will be obtained. Emails will be sent out to the major risk companies and experts in the 
field of political risk and emerging markets with the hope that they may provide insight into 
the main research question. If primary data is obtained, it will be used to supplement and 
support the secondary data.  
The methodology will be comparative research, investigating the oil and gas industries within 
Nigeria and Mexico. The underlying principle of comparative research is that, ―by comparing 
two or more cases, researchers can identify causal variables which could not be deduced from 
a single case‖ (Pierce, 2008:55). A comparative methodology uses an empirical approach and 
compares selected cases with the aim of discovering something, in this case, political risk 
variables that are found in emerging markets. The comparative method ―makes claims about 
empirically observed relationships without rigorous controls for other variables‖ (Burnham, 
Lutz, Grant & Layton-Henry, 2008:71). This method will be used so that the main political 
risk factors become evident when analysing emerging markets, with specific reference to the 
oil and gas industry.  
As mentioned, the research study will investigate the cases of Nigeria and Mexico. Nigeria 
and Mexico have been chosen as the cases for this research study, as both are seen to be 
emerging markets and have been deemed to be in the N-11 by Goldman Sachs. A comparison 
of these two cases is justified in that it offers a global study, offering a country from Africa 
and one from America. They are both oil producers on a large scale and their economies rely 
on oil production and export. Both Mexico and Nigeria possess BRIC-like potential and are 
seen to have positive momentum which can drive the global economy. Mexico‘s oil and gas 
industry is at a threshold in terms of foreign investment. The Mexican oil sector has been 
state-owned and run since 1938. However, current government reforms are looking towards 
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liberalising the oil and gas industry and allowing greater foreign investment (Schtulmann, 
2013).   
This research study will have an exploratory aspect, as it aims to discover the main risk 
factors that need to be measured when wanting to invest in the oil and gas industry in 
emerging markets. Furthermore it will also explore mitigation strategies. It will be descriptive 
in that it will create a picture of: political risk in emerging markets, the essential political risk 
factors, as well as the situation in the oil and gas industries in Nigeria and Mexico. It will also 
have an explanatory aspect as will explain the links between political risk and emerging 
markets, specifically by using the cases of Nigeria and Mexico as emerging markets. 
Exploratory research aims to ask ‗what‘ and strives to develop new questions. Descriptive 
research offers a picture of a certain situation, and aims to ask questions relating to ‗who‘, 
‗when‘, ‗where‘ and ‗how‘. Explanatory research looks at ‗why‘ something is the way it is, 
and as such attempts to explain why certain happenings take place (Neuman, 2006:33-35). 
The level of analysis for this research study is micro in scope as looks at the oil and gas 
industry, but also macro since two states, namely Nigeria and Mexico will be looked at.  
1.6 Limitations and delimitations of study 
The discipline of political risk can be seen as a limitation. It is broad in scope and there is a 
lack of consensus surrounding the term. By analysing a wide range of political risk definitions 
in chapter two, an informed conceptualisation of political risk will be arrived at. A further 
limitation is that there will be no use of field research due to time constraints and lack of 
funding. While this research study will have a reliance on predominantly secondary sources, 
the descriptive and relevant literature used will be sufficient in determining the essential 
political risk factors that need to be measured when looking at the oil and gas industry in 
emerging markets. The use of primary data, through correspondence with established risk 
companies and experts will further enhance this research study.  
A further limitation relates to the oil and gas industry and the fact that many established risk 
companies do not make information public and keep the way they look at risk as part of 
intellectual property. However, the necessary information can still be gathered from academic 
and general sources. It is imperative for this research study that the data used be credible and 
reliable. A further limitation regarding the oil and gas industry in emerging markets is that 
some data is invalid and thus unreliable. This will be overcome by using country briefs and 
reports from credible sources. Furthermore the inclusion of primary data received from 
established risk companies, which will provide expert knowledge and should prove reliable 
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and valid. A further limitation relates to the use of Mexico as a case and the fact that Spanish 
is the predominant language there. However, the existence of English research and literature 
surrounding Mexico means that using Mexico as a case is not prohibitive. 
The delimitations regarding this research study will be firstly, that only data up and to 31 
October 2013 will be used. Secondly, in terms of investigating emerging markets, only two 
cases will be discussed, namely Nigeria and Mexico. Furthermore, due to time and space 
constraints, this research study will be delimited to discovering the main political risk factors 
in the oil and gas industry in emerging markets with the aim being to then look at mitigation 
and management strategies. As such, a full political risk analysis of the oil and gas industry in 
Nigeria and Mexico will not be conducted.   
1.7    Chapter outline for the remainder of the research study  
Figure 1: Outline of the remainder of the Research Study 
Figure one shows the course this research study will take. Chapter two will conceptualise key 
terms relating to; political risk, emerging markets, the oil and gas industry, and risk 
mitigation. It will offer a theoretical foundation to the research study, based on problem 
solving theory and rational choice theory.  
Chapter three will offer a comparative contextualisation between Nigeria and Mexico. By 
analysing the cases of Nigeria and Mexico, one will gain a better understanding of emerging 
market behaviour, specifically in the oil and gas industry. This chapter will provide the basis 
from which to move towards finding the main political risk factors discussed in chapter four.  
• Introduction to the 
Research Study 
Chapter 1 
 
•Theoretical perspective 
and conceptualisation 
Chapter 2 •Nigeria and Mexico: A 
contextualisation 
Chapter 3 
 
•The Essential 
Generic Political 
Risk Factors in the 
oil and gas industry 
in emerging markets 
Chapter 4 •Evaluation and 
Conclusion 
Chapter 5 
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Chapter four will highlight the main political risk factors that the oil and gas industries in 
Nigeria and Mexico face. Using these case studies as examples of emerging markets, chapter 
four will then highlight the essential generic political risk factors that face TNOCs in 
emerging markets; those that investors should be aware of when looking to invest. This 
chapter will also provide a brief discussion on risk mitigation of industry-specific political 
risk.  
Chapter five will conclude the research study and give an overview of what each chapter 
discussed and how the research study progressed. An evaluation of the research study will be 
provided, along with possible recommendations regarding further research on the topic.   
1.8  Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a general introduction to the research study. It has provided the 
general aim of the research study, as well as a road map of how it will be directed. It has 
highlighted the research questions, the objectives and relevance of the study, the limitations 
and delimitations of the study, the methodology and research design, as well as a technical 
outline of the study and how it will progress.  This research study will primarily be concerned 
with industry-specific political risk within emerging markets. It will use the cases of Nigeria 
and Mexico and the oil and gas industry in order to determine the most salient risk factors that 
should be measured when wanting to invest in the oil and gas industry in emerging markets. 
Thereafter, risk mitigation and management strategies will be discussed. 
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CHAPTER TWO – THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE AND 
CONCEPTUALISATION 
2.1 Introduction 
The marketplace has become increasingly global; there is increased trade, economic 
integration and capital mobility, along with greater government intervention and political 
instability. A climate has been created in which ―political risk is more relevant than ever for 
companies and governments‖ (Bremmer & Keat, 2009:3). Risk and risk analysis should 
receive ample attention when making an investment decision, as ―risk is a constantly present 
factor in the business decision making process‖ (Berlin et al., 2003:1). Investors need to be 
made aware of these risks, especially if looking to invest in emerging markets where this risk 
is considered ‗unbounded‘. Many emerging markets rely on their natural resource wealth to 
be a driver of economic growth, and the oil and gas industry is highly lucrative. Oil and gas 
reserves are often situated in politically unstable areas, and ―the uncertainties and vagaries of 
the political economy of petroleum create a high risk environment‖ (Lax, 1983:7). As 
exploration and production of oil and gas in emerging markets continues, and foreign 
investment in the industry rises, the need for political risk analysis increases.  
This chapter will explore the theories associated with risk and risk analysis. Risk analysis is 
an ‗ancient craft‘ that has been used by traders for centuries, as well as by political and 
military personnel (Hough et al., 2008:6). It looks toward ―historic, current, as well as future 
investigation and aims to interpret something in terms of its effects‖ (Brink, 2004:25). 
Political risk and political risk analysis became a relevant discipline and popular field of study 
in the 1970s after the 1973 oil crisis and political risk analysis was used during the Cold War 
as a decision making tool. After the Cold War ended, political risk‘s status waned partly due 
to narrow conceptualisations of political risk as well as incorrect forecasts (Lambrechts et al., 
2011:108). Political risk has experienced a revival since the onset of globalisation, the shifting 
of global relations, and the 2008 global financial crisis (Brink, 2004:3). The global 
environment is constantly changing and the framework within which political risk operates is 
never static. Risk analysis holds great relevance and the justification behind political risk 
analysis lies with the fact that business climates and political situations are ever-changing. 
This dynamic nature means that investment opportunities are constantly being influenced and 
altered by the changing environment.  Subsequently, this means that ―political risks have to be 
checked constantly and assessments have to be upgraded continually in order to provide 
clients with literally the latest and most thorough political risk analyses‖ (Brink, 2004:10). 
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The purpose of this chapter is to explore the theoretical foundation of the research study by 
discussing the underlying theory of political risk analysis, which is found in decision-making 
and problem-solving theory. As has been noted in chapter one
6
, and discussed by Brink 
(2004:2) and Alon et al. (2006:624) there are differing opinions regarding political risk and 
there has been no agreement on a clear and concise definition. As such, this chapter will 
provide conceptualisations of the core terminology and aspects of political risk relevant to this 
study, in order to gain conceptual clarity and arrive at a concise definition of political risk. 
Furthermore, this chapter will provide conceptualisations of emerging markets and the oil and 
gas industry. Accordingly, this chapter will provide a political risk framework and a clearly 
defined point of departure from which to move to the next chapters, regarding political risk in 
the oil and gas industry in emerging markets. 
2.2 Decision-making and problem-solving theory: A theoretical foundation 
With regards to making an investment, the investor is faced with many uncertainties. Under 
such conditions, the investor must look towards making a rational decision that will aid in 
solving the problem. Decisions are considered rational if the choices made ―best help them 
achieve their objectives, given all relevant factors that are beyond their control‖ (Green, 
2002:4). Political risk and political risk analysis are grounded in decision-making and 
problem solving theory. Political risk analysis firstly creates awareness of a problem, and 
thereafter makes a rational attempt at problem solving. According to Bunge (in Brink, 
2004:30), ―in all decision making processes, rational agents behave as risk-averse persons 
intent on minimising uncertainty with the help of expert knowledge‖.  Problem solving theory 
complements decision making theory. The formulation of the specific problem along with the 
personal characteristics and values of the decision maker control the decision making 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981:453). The relationship between problem solving and decision 
making theory becomes apparent when looking at foreign investment. Here political risk 
analysis is the initial step taken in decision making and ―political risk assessment focuses on 
problems that call for decisions concerning the implementation of actions (investment), and in 
a way, deals with decision problems‖ (Brink, 2004:31). 
―The modern theory of decision making under risk emerged from a logical analysis of games 
of chance rather than from a psychological analysis of risk and value. The theory was 
conceived as a normative model of an idealized decision maker, not as a description of the 
behaviour of real people‖ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986:S251). The operative principle in 
                                                          
6
 Refer to 1.6. Limitations and delimitations of study 
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decision making is that a decision maker should anticipate what is likely to happen, decide 
what should be done, then make a choice based on the anticipated events that will produce a 
favoured result (Venter, 2009:2). Decision making can be perceived to be a cognitive 
problem. It relies on sufficient and trustworthy knowledge; however, there is often limited 
knowledge available. Furthermore, humans have a restricted capacity in terms of obtaining 
and understanding the knowledge, and lastly humans ―are always at the intersection of the 
past, the present and the future. Human experience always leads back to the past‖ (Venter, 
2009:2). This applies to political risk analysis.  
Political risk analysis is the first step in the decision making process. Decision makers will 
consider the impact of political events on their investment and its profitability. This is vital as 
in a competitive environment, the quality of a decision will determine whether an investment 
is successful (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986:S251). It is a logical and rational attempt to 
overcome the vast uncertainty that prevails in this world. ―By identifying the political risks 
that are contained in the implementation of a foreign investment decision through political 
risk analysis, structure is given to the complexities of the decision and, in doing so, one 
becomes familiar with the risks involved and uncertainty can thus be reduced‖ (Brink, 
2004:172). Political risk can impact an investment and its profitability, and political risk 
analysis enables the decision maker to see this more clearly and act accordingly (Brink, 
2004:30). Dealing with uncertainties, political risk analysis can be used as an instrument to 
guide investments and developments (Lambrechts et al., 2011:108). 
Political risk analysis allows the problem to be identified, and subsequently the risk can be 
managed or mitigated. Political risk is dynamic in nature, thus risks need to be consistently 
monitored. Changes will constantly occur and as such changes arise, new decisions will need 
to be made (Brink, 2004:31). In order to see potential problems, the risk analyst must collect 
data and information, and gain a thorough understanding of the host country, the needs of the 
investor, as well as the investment climate. 
2.3 Conceptualisation of core terminology 
2.3.1 Risk  
There are many definitions of risk. Risk is ―a manifestation of doubt regarding the frequency 
and consequences of undesirable events‖ (Chicken in Brink, 2004:17), while Bremmer & 
Keat (2009:4) see risk as probability times by impact. Similar to this definition, Hough 
(2008:11) states that risk is ―a probabilistic assessment and not a precise prediction‖. Hough 
et al. (2008) propose that risk is the ―undesirable and potential harm or danger to anyone that 
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results from behaviour and action, or from a particular event, situation or issue‖. Hough 
(2008:11) also distinguishes between three types of risk; real, perceived and acceptable.  Real 
is the actual risk, perceived risk is socially constructed, and acceptable risk is seen to be 
sustainable risk decided by decision makers. According to Lax (1983:8), risk is dynamic and 
deals with change, ―current conditions are not risks; rather, risk stems from changes in those 
conditions.‖ For example there are certain rules in place when a decision to invest is made, 
and risk highlights the notion that these rules may change in the future. The connotations 
linked to risk are usually negative, as often risk has an unfavourable impact on a company.  
Risk is frequently wrongly equated with uncertainty and instability and therefore a clear 
distinction in necessary. The terms are not synonymous; rather uncertainty and instability can 
be seen to be properties of risk. ―Political risk is a more objective measurement of the amount 
of doubt, in contrast to the more subjective nature of instability and uncertainty‖ (Brink, 
2004:19). According to Miller (in Alon & Martin, 1998:11), uncertainty can arise from 
varying sources; political, social, natural, macroeconomic and government policy. 
Uncertainty ―implies an inability to determine the probability or the impact (or both) of a 
certain future event‖ (Bremmer & Keat, 2009:16). Political risk on the other hand, aims to 
determine both of these, even if at times this cannot be done. Political risk is measurable, thus 
can be seen as quantifiable uncertainty. It looks to transforming uncertainty into something 
that is easier to deal with (Bremmer & Keat, 2009:17). ―Political uncertainty results from 
inadequacy of information, whereas political risk is rather a more objective measurement of 
the amount of doubt, in contrast to the more subjective nature of instability and uncertainty‖ 
(Howell, 1986:5). Valid information can aid in taking uncertainty, measuring it and then 
converting it to risk (Kobrin, 1979:68).  
Political instability is a political risk factor, and ―political risk implies some ability to form a 
judgement (if only subjective) about the probability of different types of instability and to take 
all reasonable precautions against it (Frynas & Mellahi, 2003:546). Political instability and 
political risk are not mutually exclusive, they relate to each other in that instability can be 
seen as a factor of political risk. The biggest difference however, is that political instability is 
a property of the environment, while political risk is a property of a firm (Kobrin, 1979:70). 
For example, in Nigeria, the religious tensions resulting from political instability stem from 
and belong to the environment, that being Nigeria, while the level of political risk that is 
experienced because of these tensions belongs to the firm.  
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Political instability, stemming from changes in government, riots, policy changes or 
implementation of policy gets a great deal of attention in global affairs and is often the reason 
for corporations not investing in a country. ―With such a high sensitivity to ‗political 
instability‘, it is possible that inexperienced international enterprises have missed business 
opportunities because they have perceived more political risk than actually existed‖ (Robock 
1971:15). Before political risk can be looked at in-depth and a concise definition arrived at, 
the concept of country risk must be addressed. 
2.3.2 Country risk 
Country risk and political risk used to be seen as one and the same and were used 
interchangeably. Nowadays however, it has been realised that different firms and industries 
face differing risks, risks which go beyond the explanation that a country risk report provides 
(Alon et al., 2006:626). Country risk can be explained as ―potential financial losses due to the 
problems arising from macroeconomic events…that are uncontrollable yet often inevitable. 
Political risk, on the other hand, recognised as factors caused by government policy (in)action 
or reaction, can to some extent be managed, if not avoided‖ (Brink, 2004:175). Country risk 
also relates to a sovereign state not being able to pay back money borrowed, whereas political 
risk implies that a country is unwilling to pay back money borrowed (Krayenbuehl, in Frei & 
Ruloff, 1988:3; Brink, 2004:23).  
Political risk is a ―specialised relation of country risk‖ (Brink, 2004:21). Country risk factors 
are relevant to political risk. Country risk is more economic, and focuses on transfer and 
sovereign risk. As such, country risk reports are used when determining credit ratings (Brink, 
2004:19). Political risk deals with micro and macro risks, whereas country risk focuses on 
potential financial losses, those that arise from macro-economic events. Country risk‘s focus 
is on business outcomes, whereas political risk aims at an assessment and management of 
risk, which can not only be beneficial towards business, but a variety of sectors (Hough, 
2008:6). As country risk refers to macro-economic factors, this research study is not 
intimately concerned with country risk, and instead will focus on political risk as will be 
explained below.  
2.3.3 Political risk  
Political risk definitions range between the general and the specific (Fitzpatrick, 1983:249).  
The changing environment, especially the effect of globalisation has recently brought political 
risk to the fore. Whereas traditional approaches lacked systematic analysis, nowadays 
political risk has become more adaptable due to the awareness of a changing global 
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environment. This being said, consensus has not yet been reached regarding the term political 
risk and there are many definitions. Bremmer and Keat (2009:5) define political risk as, ―the 
probability that a particular political action will produce changes in economic outcomes‖, 
while Root (in Kobrin, 1979:68) defines it as the ―possible occurrence of a political event of 
any kind (such as war, expropriation, exchange controls and import restrictions) at home or 
abroad that can cause a loss of profit potential and/or assets in an international business 
operation‖. 
Kobrin (1979:77) states that political risk is ―the probability that changes in the political 
environment will reduce returns to the point where the project would be no longer acceptable 
on the basis of ex ante criteria.‖ Similar to this is Howell‘s (1998:3) definition, that political 
risk is ―the possibility that political decisions or events in a country will affect the business 
climate in such a way that investors will lose money or not make as much money as they 
expected when the investment was made‖. Lax (1983:9) states that political risk ―is the 
likelihood that political changes will prompt a change in the investment climate regulating a 
project‖. A further definition is that of Robock (1971:7) who defines political risk as what 
emerges ―when discontinuities occur in the business environment, when they are difficult to 
anticipate, and when they result from political change…These changes must have a potential 
for significantly affecting the profit or other goals of a particular enterprise‖. Kobrin‘s (1979), 
Howell‘s (1998), Lax‘s (1983) and Robock‘s (1971) definitions focus on changes that occur 
within the political environment.  
An industry-specific definition of political risk is found in the ASPRO/SPAIR model 
(Assessment of probabilities/subjective Probabilities Assigned to Investment Risks) designed 
by Shell Oil. This definition relates to the oil and gas industry and defines political risk as, 
―the probability of not maintaining the described contract during the 10-year time span in the 
face of changing economic and political circumstances‖ (Gebelein, Pearson & Silbergh 
1978:726). This is very focused towards the oil and gas industry. Using a slightly expanded 
definition can provide more flexibility and scope, as found in Brink‘s definition.  
Brink (2004:25) defines political risk as, ―the probability that interrelated factors caused or 
influenced by government political decisions, (in)actions, reactions, or other unforeseen 
external or internal events will affect business and investment climates in such a way, that 
investors will lose money or not make as much money as they expected when the initial 
decision to invest was made‖. This definition, while providing more clarity to the term, does 
not mention the distinction between macro and micro risk. However, this distinction can be 
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found in Simon‘s (1982:68) definition which states that political risk is, ―governmental or 
societal actions and policies, originating either within or outside the host country, and 
negatively affecting either a select group of, or the majority of, foreign business operations 
and investments‖. Joining Brink (2004) and Simon‘s (1982) definitions form an appropriate 
definition that holds relevance for TNOCs wanting to operate or who are already operating in 
the oil and gas industry in emerging markets. For the purposes of this study, political risk is 
defined as: the probability that interrelated factors caused or influenced by government 
political decisions, (in)actions, and reactions, originating either within or outside the host 
country, will negatively affect either a select group of, or the majority of, foreign business 
operations and investments. 
2.3.4 Political risk analysis 
Political risk analysis should be one of the first steps in a foreign investment decision, as it 
allows investors to be better equipped. Hough (2008:6) theorises risk analysis to be ―the 
systematic means of assessing and managing the political risks of foreign direct investment or 
international business‖. According to Lax (1983:17), political risk analysis serves three vital 
functions. It enables a company to; firstly, rationally question whether an investment project 
should be pursued; secondly, it keeps a firm aware of political conditions and their influence 
on corporate interests, which allows for smart management of political risk; and thirdly, it 
aids a firm in developing an external policy that is applicable to the particular national 
environment (Lax, 1983:17).  
Political risk analysis is becoming more systematic, and a variety of methodologies, 
approaches and models can be used. According to Lax (1983:109), political risk analysis has 
two steps, forecasting relevant risks and then evaluating the impact, as ―knowing tomorrow is 
not sufficient; determining how tomorrow will affect operations, profits, and other corporate 
concerns is the key‖ (Lax, 1983:110). When conducting a political risk analysis, one needs to 
determine political risk factors, depending on the circumstances and context. Failed states, 
border disputes, foreign policy, support for government and states in transition are examples 
of political risk factors (Brink, 2004:25). ―It is irresponsible to present a client with a risk 
assessment that does not incorporate economic as well as political risk factors, let alone 
environmental, societal and socio-economic factors of political risk‖ (Brink, 2004:11). A 
further important attribute of risk analysis is mitigation, finding a way that losses can be 
avoided (Bischoff & Lambrechts, 2010:61). 
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For the purposes of this study, political risk analysis is conceptualised as: an analytical 
process by which political risk is assessed within a specific framework, which aims to 
determine relevant political risk factors, measure them, forecast the probability of the 
political risk occurring, and look at ways of managing and mitigating such risk.  
With relevant definitions of political risk and political risk analysis now provided, it is 
essential to look at industry-specific risk as this research study looks at political risk in the oil 
and gas industry in emerging markets. According to Frei & Ruloff (1988:5), ―political risks 
should always be assessed in the specific perspective of a specific business project‖.  
2.3.5 Industry-specific political risk 
Industry-specific risk holds significance nowadays in political risk analysis. Country risk and 
political risk used to be categorised as one in the same. However now, ―it is understood that 
specific projects, firms, and industries face markedly different risks within countries‖ (Alon et 
al., 2006:626). The nature and scope of political risk changes and different industries face 
different risks. What one firm may deem a political risk, another firm may not. As such, 
political risk definitions should be adapted to fit with different circumstances (Alon et al., 
2006:626). Kobrin (1982:40) agrees with this aspect, stating that ―the impact of most political 
events varies from firm to firm and from project to project‖. Macro risk is often country-wide, 
affects most or all industries, and can be caused by governmental, societal or economic 
factors. Civil war or shifts in governmental power are examples of macro-risk. Macro risks 
are more visible and dramatic, while micro risks are more prevalent. The effect that micro risk 
has on a firm can be ―substantial and unpredictable, as well as more frequent and widespread‖ 
(Alon & Herbert, 2009:129). 
Micro risk affects a certain industry, firm, project, or select group. It is much more specific in 
nature when compared to macro risk, as the level of analysis includes the host country, along 
with factors such as project features, the firm‘s nationality, the industry, as well as the 
relationship with host country (Alon & Herbert, 2009:127). Examples of micro risk are price 
controls, expatriate employment limits, labour unrest, and corruption. Alon & Herbert 
(2009:130) define micro political risk as:  
―The uncertainty associated with outcomes or events from political processes, which have the 
potential and specific consequences for the firm that is either contemplating entry into, or has 
already entered, another country. These political processes can result in outcomes or events 
which can (1) emanate from environmental factors both within and outside the foreign host 
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country, and (2) either positively or negatively affects the firm‘s operations, assets, or financial 
condition‖. 
Both macro and micro risk can originate from either internal or external sources. Internal 
sources are those which originate from inside the country, for instance government policies, 
local power struggles and economic conditions. External sources are those which originate 
outside of the host country, for instance international sanctions or conflicts between the host 
country and other countries (Alon & Herbert, 2009:129). Macro and micro risk are not 
mutually exclusive and rather, overlap in some instances. Micro risk will supplement and 
facilitate macro risk analysis and ―a firm can use its micro risk understanding to adjust the 
macro political risk profile to its particularistic risk exposure‖ (Alon & Herbert, 2009:128). 
Kobrin (1982:40) agrees and states ―the impact of most political events varies from firm to 
firm and from project to project‖. It is also important to look at political risk, not just within 
the business environment, but also from a resource based view, as different firms have 
differing resources which may impact the effect that certain political risks have, as well as 
differing capabilities through which to deal with risk (Frynas & Mellahi, 2003:562). Rather 
than industries and firms being helpless victims of political risk, it can work to their 
advantage depending on how it is managed. For example, in 2003 because of the disorder in 
Nigeria‘s petroleum policy, Shell was able to maintain their dominant position in the industry 
without there being too many other firms entering (Frynas & Mellahi, 2003:561). A specific 
firm or industry must be an active actor when it comes to the arena they operate in, as 
―successful business strategy is about actively shaping the game you play, not just playing the 
game you find‖ (Brandenburger & Nalebuff in Frynas & Mellahi, 2003:563). 
Macro risk is broad in nature and makes insights on national or regional level, whereas micro 
risk is more particular, and is thus seen to be more relevant and specific than macro risk (Alon 
& Herbert, 2009:128). Micro risk is also ―much more manageable and thereby practically 
useful‖ (Alon et al., 2006:627), and when risk is added to ―conventional macro political risk 
evaluations, the firm can develop a full-continuum assessment of specific risks and potential 
political actions‖ (Alon & Herbert, 2009:136). Macro risk is important; however, each 
industry has unique micro political risks which they should take into consideration. 
Understanding political risk and conducting an industry-specific risk analysis in the oil and 
gas industry in emerging markets is vitally important, due to the uniqueness and nuanced 
nature of micro risk. Micro risk is also highly prevalent in the extractive industries, due to 
―growing nationalistic feelings and a conviction that natural resource endowments should be 
exploited for the welfare of all people in a nation rather than for private profit‖ (Robock, 
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1971:10). Political risk must be conducted from the standpoint of the specific firm involved in 
the oil and gas industry in emerging markets.  
2.3.6 Risk management and mitigation 
Identifying the political risks is just the start of conducting a full political risk analysis. Once 
this has been done, it should be looked at how to mitigate and manage such risks. This is a 
vital step for TNOCs to take when operating abroad and is ―crucial to the ultimate success of 
any new investments or expansion of already existing business operations‖ (Berlin et al., 
2003:1). According to Brink (2004:149), political risk management is ―the sum of the actions 
foreign investors or MNCs take to try and keep at an acceptable level the degree or measure 
of investment risk associated with their activities‖. Hough (2008:5) defines risk management 
as, ―protecting the organisation, its people, assets, and profits, against the physical and 
financial consequences (adverse) of event risk‖. TNOCs need a knowledge and understanding 
of the various risks so that mitigating and management can look to reducing the risk or 
eliminating it altogether. The taking out of political risk insurance and conducting de facto 
insurance, which relates to behaviour such as maintaining good relations between local 
leaders and open and honest dialogue with the host country, are examples of risk 
management. 
Brink (2004) discusses protective and integrative techniques when looking towards risk 
management. Protective techniques ―reduce the severity of loss and aim to protect the key 
internal strengths of the MNC‖, while integrative techniques, ―are concerned with reducing 
the frequency of loss and their main aim is to influence relations with institutions and actors 
in the political environment‖ (Brink, 2004:156). Ideally, risk management should consist of 
both techniques. Protective measures will ensure the firm‘s competitive strong points, while 
integrative measures will ensure the firm will respond to both ―the demands of a host 
country‘s political environment and the opportunities that the environment presents‖ (Brink, 
2004:156).  
Emerging markets exhibit high growth and profitable investment opportunities. Foreign 
companies find investment in these markets attractive; however, risk management in these 
emerging countries is of vital importance due to the large sum of capital investment made. For 
example, investments in the oil and gas industry can exceed US$1 billion (Berlin et al., 
2003:1). Risk management strategies will depend on the nature of the investment and the 
industry (Lax, 1983:177). Emerging markets are rich in natural resources. However, they 
often ―lack the capital and technical expertise to develop their mineral wealth efficiently and 
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safely‖ (Riordan, 2007:54), and this makes managing and mitigating political risk within the 
oil and gas industry in emerging markets that much more important. 
Industry-specific risk analysis is unique depending on the firm involved. As such, mitigation 
and management strategies will differ depending on the risks involved and how the firm sees 
these and to what degree they think they will have an impact on the firm‘s actions. Efficient 
political risk management requires differentiating between activities that pose a real threat to a 
firm‘s performance from political actions that are merely dramatic (Berlin et al., 2006:3). 
Most political risk is manageable but cannot be eradicated completely, hence effective 
management aids in a TNOC‘s exposure to risk being controlled. Management of political 
risks is needed in the oil and gas industry in emerging markets, as oil and gas reserves are 
often situated in unstable geological locations which can exhibit political tensions, and this 
leads to an unstable investment environment (Brink, 2004:149). Added to this, energy 
commodity prices are volatile and political risks may cause prices to rise or decrease at any 
time (Berlin et al., 2003:2). Political risk is dynamic in nature, as such the risk may be 
mitigated in the short term but risk needs consistent managing (Brink, 2004:30). Volatile 
2.3.7 Emerging markets 
Emerging markets exhibit rapid growth and industrialisation and are seen to be in a 
transitional period. ―For the past five years, emerging markets have accounted for two-thirds 
of the world‘s growth. By 2020, that number is expected to grow to 75%‖ (Eurasia Group, 
2013b). While political risks such as expropriation, political violence, and nationalisation are 
evident in emerging markets, ―over the past several years, nothing has fuelled the optimism of 
pundits and the ambitions of investors more than the words ‗emerging markets‘‖ (Bremmer & 
Keat, 2009:68). 
The term ‗emerging markets‘ was coined in 1981, by Antoine van Agtmael, a World Bank 
economist at the International Financial Corporation (Authers, 2006). Van Agtmael defines 
emerging markets as those economies with low-to-middle per capita income, which showed a 
sense of dynamism and progress. Jim O‘Neill, Chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset 
Management defines emerging markets as the largest populations after BRIC, which, 
―combined with economic and political conditions, could greatly impact the global economy‖ 
(Goldman Sachs, 2013b). According to Bremmer and Keat (2009:68), an emerging market 
country is ―one in which politics will matter at least as much as basic economic fundamentals 
for the performance of markets‖. Bremmer and Keat (2009:68) also see emerging markets as 
those countries which have embraced globalisation because it is seen to be politically useful. 
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 Khanna & Palepu (2010) see emerging markets as having institutional voids which lead to 
operational challenges and higher transaction costs. As such, ―emerging markets reflect those 
transactional arenas where buyers and sellers are not easily or efficiently able to come 
together. Ideally, every economy would provide a range of institutions to facilitate the 
functioning of markets, but developing countries fall short in a number of ways‖. A differing 
definition is offered by Kvint, who in 1999 conducted a study of emerging markets in order to 
find their main characteristics. He found these factors create a ―comfortable and attractive 
environment for global business, foreign investment and international trade‖. Kvint‘s (1999) 
definition of an emerging market is: 
―A society transitioning from a dictatorship to a free-market-oriented-economy, with 
increasing economic freedom, gradual integration with the Global Marketplace and with other 
members of the GEM (Global Emerging Market), an expanding middle class, improving 
standards of living, social stability and tolerance, as well as an increase in cooperation with 
multilateral institutions‖.  
A definition such as Kvint‘s (1999) is very different to that of Khanna and Palepu (2010).  
Goldman Sachs has created an updated definition, referring to emerging markets as ‗growth 
economies‘. A ‗growth economy‘ is ―one that is likely to experience rising productivity, 
which together with favourable demographics, points to economic growth that outpaces the 
global average‖ (O‘Neill, 2011). Nowadays there are many definitions of emerging markets 
and this has led to the lists of emerging markets not being the same, due to different 
companies using differing criteria when choosing which countries to include. These differing 
lists blur the distinction between developed countries, developing countries, underdeveloped 
countries and emerging markets. 
 For the purpose of this research study the definition of emerging markets that will be used 
will be formed from the definitions of Jim O‘Neill (2011) and that of Bremmer and Keat 
(2009).  These definitions have been chosen due to the relevance they hold to the research 
study. Bremmer is the CEO of the Eurasia Group and the listing of emerging markets was the 
number one risk for 2013, as identified by the Eurasia Group in their ‗Top Risks 2013‘ report. 
Jim O‘Neill identified what has been termed the N-11 and this formed the basis of choosing 
of the case studies, Nigeria and Mexico. As such, emerging markets are: those countries with 
the largest populations after BRIC where politics matters at least as much as basic economic 
fundamentals for the performance of markets, and have the ability to greatly impact the 
global economy. 
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2.3.8 The oil and gas industry in emerging markets 
Oil and gas are non-renewable and exhaustible natural resources that are readily marketable. 
Oil cannot be rivalled by other natural resources, as ―in literal and figurative senses, 
petroleum fuels the world economy‖ (Lax, 1983:85). The oil and gas industry holds 
significance; politically, socially and economically. It is a vital input for emerging economies, 
holds importance for local welfare and is of importance to national governments and TNOCs. 
The oil and gas industry is highly lucrative and oil companies are considered the giants in 
industry. In 2012, ExxonMobil, a multinational oil and gas corporation, held the number one 
spot on the Fortune 500 list, making a US$44.8 billion profit. Success in the oil and gas 
industry is ―quantifiable in terms of relative and absolute increases in petroleum prices‖ (Lax, 
1983:7). While the potential profits are high, the industry is extremely capital intensive and 
costly. These costs extend to exploration, extraction, infrastructure, production and refining, 
and exploration makes up around 20% of the total cost (Lax, 1983:46). However, costs will 
vary depending on the geological location of reserves and as Berlin et al. (2003) suggest, 
―there is usually a direct correlation between the degree of political risk that a company is 
prepared to accept, and the degree of geological potential of the proposed area‖. The set up 
costs are high; however, TNOCs are willing to accept this along with the risks, as once in 
place high profits can be made and the potential benefits outweigh the risks (Boschoff, 
2010:1).  
Governments at times are unwilling to assume initial costs and prefer to pass these on to 
TNOCs. This relates to exploration and initial production, where huge capital injections are 
needed. Once production starts, TNOCS‘ agreements with host governments are regularly 
altered or renegotiated to work to the advantage of the host government. The government has 
greater control and more bargaining strength and as such, ―an operating hydrocarbon-
production project is a permanent hostage in the hands of the host government‖ (Lax, 
1983:47). Once production begins, nearly all of the economic and geological risks are no 
longer; however, the political risk that a firm must deal with increases. The industry becomes 
vulnerable to political risks such as expropriation, nationalisation terrorism, wars, political 
instability, environmental activism, governmental regulations, energy vulnerability, and 
taxation, to name a few (Alon et al., 2006:631; Lax, 1983:85). 
Operation in the oil and gas industry is described as the ―most sensitive of all international 
corporate activities because the resources involved are a country‘s ‗national patrimony‘, and 
such projects can impact a country more than other activities through the attendant wealth, 
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international prestige, and power‖ (Alon et al., 2006:631). No matter the type of government 
system, whether they are democratic, authoritarian, or socialist, or from the North, South, East 
or West, host-countries exhibit very similar goals relating to political control and economic 
returns when it comes to the oil and gas industry. Oil‘s contribution as a material input for 
economies is vast and as such, the industry is subject to great political concern. Host 
governments use the industry to further other goals such as welfare and political stability 
(Lax, 1983:7; Berlin et al., 2003:1). This nationalist sentiment and the altering of agreements 
is a large political risk for the company involved. Some countries prohibit foreign 
participation and the oil and gas companies are state-owned. These companies become a 
source of national pride and government instrument to improve and strengthen policy (Lax, 
1983:52). Nigeria conducted nationalisation and expropriation during the 1970s and anti-
foreign laws were put in place in order for economic development to occur without foreign 
impediment (Banwo & Ighodalo, 2011). Nowadays however, the Nigerian oil and gas industry 
welcomes foreign investment and expertise. An example of a completely state-owned industry 
is Mexico‘s oil and gas industry. State-owned Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex) has sole control 
over the industry. However, there are signs that this may change soon, as the current 
President, Enrique Peña Nieto wants to allow foreign investment in the oil and gas industry. 
Oil production has been on the decline in Mexico and there is a need for foreign investment, 
technology and expertise (Daly, 2012).  
2.4 Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter has been to explore the underlying theory of political risk 
analysis, namely that of decision making and problem solving theory, which forms the 
theoretical grounding for this research study. This chapter also conceptualised the core 
concepts that will be used in this research study, that of risk, risk analysis, political instability, 
country risk, political risk, industry-specific risk, risk management and mitigation, emerging 
markets and the oil and gas industry. This chapter has provided a theoretical and contextual 
framework for the remainder of the research study. 
Chapter three will offer a comparative contextualisation between Nigeria and Mexico. Here 
the cases will be contextualised. By analysing the cases of Nigeria and Mexico, one will gain 
a better understanding of emerging market behaviour, specifically in the oil and gas industry. 
This chapter will provide the basis from which to move towards finding the main political risk 
factors discussed in chapter four. 
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CHAPTER THREE – NIGERIA AND MEXICO: A 
CONTEXTUALISATION 
3.1 Introduction 
As explained in the previous chapters, Nigeria and Mexico are considered to be emerging 
markets. According to O‘Neill (2011), Nigeria and Mexico‘s economies have ―sufficient size 
and depth‖ which allows for ease of initial investment as well as freedom to exit when foreign 
firms so choose. Both Nigeria and Mexico are major oil producers, and the oil and gas 
industry contributes greatly to their economic growth. Chapter three will offer a comparative 
contextualisation between Nigeria and Mexico. The cases will be contextualised, which will 
enable a better understanding of emerging market behaviour, specifically in the oil and gas 
industry. 
A historical contextualisation of Nigeria will first be provided, thereafter Nigeria as an 
emerging market will be discussed. This will provide an appropriate platform from which to 
move onto discussing the oil and gas industry in Nigeria, looking at the history of the industry 
as well as placing specific emphasis on the Niger Delta region. Mexico will then be 
contextualised in the same manner. A brief history of Mexico will be given before looking at 
Mexico as an emerging market. Thereafter the oil and gas industry will be discussed, with 
specific focus being placed on the Gulf of Mexico as an oil producing region.  
3.2 Nigeria 
3.2.1 Historical contextualisation of Nigeria 
Nigeria is the largest and most populous country in Africa. Nigeria is a federal republic with a 
presidential system and is made up of 36 states and 774 local government areas. The capital 
Abuja is located in the centre of the country. Nigeria is Africa‘s largest oil producer and is 
bordered by Niger, Mali, Cameroon and Chad. Nigeria is ―an archetypal deeply-divided 
society characterised by divergent languages, cultures, ethnic groups and geographic regions‖ 
(Bischoff & Lambrechts, 2010:75). With a population of over 160 million people, Nigeria 
makes up 47% of the West African population.  There are more than 250 ethnic groups and 
over 500 indigenous languages. The south of Nigeria is predominantly Christian and urban, 
while the North is predominantly Islamic and rural (El-Choueiry et al., 2013:1). The main 
ethnic groups are the Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba. 
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Map 1: Nigeria (EIA, 2012b:2) 
Nigeria was colonised in 1901 by Britain. Independence was granted in 1960; however, 
Nigeria was left with many challenges. Britain had used Nigeria to serve its own interests, and 
when independence was granted, Nigeria was left to cope with severe economic, political and 
social under-development, along with colonial effects, such as personal rule, subordination, 
and weak centralisation. In comparison to other British colonies such as South Korea and 
India, Nigeria was left worse off when independence was granted (Kholi, 2004:291).  
Nigeria had its first democratic elections in 1999. However, elections have been marred by 
tension and manipulation and the 2007 elections saw a great deal of election violence and 
vote rigging. Goodluck Jonathan took over as President in 2010 after the death of his 
predecessor, Mr Yar‘Adua. In April 2011 new elections were held and Goodluck Jonathan 
was elected. He is Nigeria‘s current President. Nigeria has its challenges; one being political 
instability. This has been exacerbated by the ethnic and religious tensions apparent in the 
country and in recent years this has increased due to the presence of Boko Haram
7
, which 
presents a threat to national security (El-Choureiry et al., 2013:1).  
 
                                                          
7 Boko Haram is an Islamic group dedicated to the spread of Sharia Law in Nigeria (Aribisala, 2013). 
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3.2.2 Nigeria as an emerging market 
Economics and politics are still very interlinked in Nigeria, and this is one factor which makes 
Nigeria an emerging market. With its wealth of resources, Africa is attractive to foreign 
investors. In 2012 when asked about the potential of Nigeria joining the BRIC group, O‘Neill 
stated that, ―if Nigeria could impose the level of leadership, a whole new way of governance 
in which corruption is dramatically reduced, Nigeria is I think very interesting…It‘s 20% of 
Africa‘s population, which means it could be pretty powerful‖ (O‘Neill in Cohn, 2010). As 
previously mentioned, O‘Neill chose the N-11 countries due to their BRIC-like potential, 
large population size, and ability to experience positive momentum. According to a senior oil 
executive from ExxonMobil, Nigeria is an emerging market due to the fact that tremendous 
development needs growth potential, which Nigeria has (Personal interview two, 16 August 
2013). Nigeria has a vast amount of both human and natural resources, placing it in a 
prosperous economic position. 
The oil and gas industry forms the fiscal basis of economic development, and federal and state 
power in Nigeria. As such, oil plays a large role in this African emerging market, contributing 
greatly to economic growth and sustainability. In 2012, the oil and gas industry accounted for 
70% of government revenue and 95% of export earnings (IMF, 2013). Nigeria abides by the 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), which looks toward more effective 
governance within the oil sector. The strength of the oil industry is also evident when looking 
at the Excess Crude Account (ECA). After the financial crisis, Nigeria was able to maintain 
growth and finance the fiscal stimulus through accessing the ECA (World Bank, 2013b).  
The oil and gas industry in Nigeria holds significant strategic importance, as oil has 
dominated the Nigerian economy and its international relations in terms of geo-political and 
economic power (Peel, 2009:xvi). The Nigerian economy however, relies heavily on the oil 
and gas industry and is said to be greatly dependent on TNOCs (Ebohon, 2012:204). 
Dependence on oil has led to a ―transition to monoculture economy, which now sits side by 
side the politics of a petrol-state‖ (Ebohon, 2012:217). Nigeria holds wealth; however, there is 
a lack of development, showing one of the negative effects that the oil and gas industry has 
had on Nigeria.  
An over-reliance on the oil industry has led to Nigeria developing what is known in economic 
terms as Dutch disease, which sees the natural resources continually exploited while the 
manufacturing sector continues to decline (Emerging Markets, 2013). This over-reliance on 
oil has left Nigeria vulnerable to fluctuating oil prices and oil crises (Kholi, 2004:351). 
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Furthermore, oil is of great significance to ethnic communities as oil producing areas are 
mainly situated in ethnic minority regions. Tensions arise relating to oil revenue access and 
distribution and oil plays a crucial role in community relations and national politics (Obi & 
Rustad, 2011:4). Nigeria needs to continue to look at energy reform and helping to grow the 
non-oil sector. An increase in economic growth through efficient use of all sectors will aid in 
the decrease of poverty and allow greater access to education and health, as well as greater 
infrastructural growth. Overall, corruption needs to be stemmed in all sectors of government 
(Emerging Markets, 2013).  
3.2.3 History of the oil and gas industry in Nigeria 
Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa, and has the largest natural gas reserves on the 
continent. According to the EIA
8
 (2012c:3), Nigeria has the capacity to produce over three 
million barrels per day (bbl/d). Nigeria has miles of pipelines, four oil refineries, and ten 
export terminals. The pipelines range from 31 miles to 383 miles long and these are situated 
in swampy, rural areas predominantly. Oil is primarily found in the Niger Delta; however, oil 
is also present off-shore in the Gulf of Guinea, the Bight of Benin, and the Bight of Bonny. 
The first deep-water oil field began production in 2003, and today these deep-water fields 
contribute 800,000 bbl/d (EIA, 2012c:3).  
In 1937 during colonial rule, British Petroleum and Shell were given the right by the 
government to explore Nigeria for oil (Ebohon, 2012:204). Oil was discovered in 1956 in 
Bayelsa state by Shell-BP, and oil was first exported in 1958 from the Oloibiri oil field.  It 
was only in the mid-1960s however, that international interest in Nigerian oil escalated. After 
the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, alternative sources of crude oil needed to be found. Interest in 
Nigeria increased, exports rose and Nigerian oil began to gain political attention (Ebohon, 
2012:201). In 1971, Nigeria became a member of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), which requires a production quota of 1.704 million bbl/d to be produced. 
In terms of total reserves, in 2011 it was reported that Nigeria had 37.2 billion barrels of 
proven oil reserves. The government wants to increase this to 40 billion barrels in the coming 
years. In terms of exports; Nigeria is the fourth largest foreign oil supplier to the United States 
(US). In 2011, 33% of Nigeria‘s crude exports were sent to the US (see Figure 2). The other 
major importers of Nigerian oil include; Europe (28%), India (12%), Brazil (8%), Canada 
(5%), and South Africa (3%) (EIA, 2012c:9). 
                                                          
8
 The EIA provides ―policy-neutral data, forecasts, and analyses to promote sound policy making, efficient 
markets, and public understanding regarding energy and its interaction with the economy and the environment‖ 
(EIA, 2012a). 
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Figure 2: Nigerian crude oil exports (EIA, 2012c:10) 
 
As interest in Nigerian oil increased, the occurrence of TNOCs rose, leaving little room for 
indigenous participation in the oil and gas industry. Between 1958 and 1968, the oil industry 
in Nigeria was entirely controlled by foreign firms. In 1969 the Petroleum Act was passed, 
which gave ownership of the oil over to the state. In 1977, the Nigerian Petroleum Company 
(NNPC) was created. Later in 1988, the NNPC was divided into 12 subsidiary companies 
(EIA, 2012c:7). The NNPC‘s main function is the regulation of the oil and gas industry. The 
Nigerian oil companies lack the technology and expertise, and as such, joint ventures (JVs) 
with the NNPC make up the majority of oil and gas projects in Nigeria. TNOCs who operate 
in Nigeria under JVs include; Chevron, ExxonMobil, Eni, Total, Addax Petroleum, Petrobass, 
ConocoPhillips and StatoilHydro. The TNOCs enjoy large amounts of freedom within the 
industry, being able to decide budgets, staff conditions, and technology unhindered. The 
Nigerian government largely depends on the oil rents from the TNOCs, which makes the 
government ―more of an oil gatekeeper and oil revenue collector‖ (Obi & Rustad, 2011:4). 
Shell is the largest oil company operating in Nigeria at present, and has been there since 1936. 
The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC) and the Shell Nigeria 
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Exploration and Production Company Limited (SNEPCo) are the two branches of Shell 
operating in Nigeria (EIA, 2012c:8). SPDC is the largest in Nigeria. It is a JV comprising of 
NNPC (55%), Shell (30%), Elf Petroleum Nigeria Limited (10%), and Agip (5%). SNEPCo 
on the other hand is fully owned by Shell. SNEPCo focuses on deep water, off shore oil and 
gas production, and was formed in 1993. SDPC has two export terminals, nine gas plants, and 
a vast array of pipelines. They produce 1.2-1.3 million bbl/d (EIA, 2012c:8). The majority of 
their production takes place in the Niger Delta, in shallow waters and has often been the 
hardest hit by instability. ExxonMobil is the second largest TNOC operating in Nigeria, 
producing 800,000 bbl/d (EIA, 2012c:8). 
A recent government objective has been taken to make the NNPC a more profit-driven 
company. In April 2010, the Nigerian Content Development Bill (NCD) was passed. This bill 
looks to increasing the role of Nigerian companies in the oil and gas industry. In 2008, the 
Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) was drafted. The PIB looks toward major reformation of the oil 
and gas industry, and towards creating a clear regulatory framework for the industry. Its 
purpose is to ―restructure the hydrocarbon sector, clarifying regulatory and operational roles 
of the Nigeria energy institutions, and increasing government take and local content 
requirements‖ (EIA, 2012c:1). If implemented the PIB will legislate that 10% of the oil 
revenues will be directly given to the oil communities, which it is hoped will decrease the 
tension apparent in the Niger Delta region (Ukiwo, 2011:27). At present, the 100-page 
document is being deliberated by the National Assembly, but progress has been slow due to 
debate within government as well as a lack of support from the TNOCs (EIA, 2012c:3). 
Subsequently, the PIB has delayed investment in the industry, particularly in the Niger Delta 
region.  
3.2.4 The Niger Delta 
Oil production is primarily found in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, and the oil found here 
is considered to be high-quality light, sweet crude. The Niger Delta is located in the southern 
part of Nigeria, where the Niger River meets the Atlantic Ocean. The Niger Delta is Africa‘s 
largest wetland and covers an area of 75,000 square kilometres, has a population of over 30 
million people that come from 40 different ethnic groups, and is made up of nine out of 
Nigeria‘s 36 states, with 185 local governing areas (Bischoff & Lambrechts, 2010:59). The 
nine states which make up the Niger Delta are: Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Cross River, Rivers, 
Bayelsa, Delta, Imo, Ondo and Edo. Delta, Rivers and Bayelsa States are considered the most 
important in terms of oil. Oil operations in the Niger delta are made up of 86 oil fields which 
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together cover 30,000 square kilometres and consist of 6000 kilometres of pipelines and 1000 
oil wells (Kimer, 2012). 
 
Map 2: The Niger Delta (EIA, 2012c:11) 
 
Despite its oil wealth, the Niger Delta is one of the most fragile and under-developed areas of 
Nigeria. Instability in the Niger Delta has at times hindered development within the oil and 
gas industry. Since the 1990s, tensions in the Niger Delta have increased with oil being at the 
source of the conflict. Oil production has brought with it environmental degradation and 
pollution, and this along with the location of the TNOCs oil co ncessions has led to the loss of 
arable farming land (Obi & Rustad, 2011:2). Local communities have felt increasingly 
marginalised, which has been exacerbated by continued state corruption and repression. There 
is a lack of transparency regarding oil revenue and its distribution, and as such, relations have 
become strained between the local communities and the TNOC‘s, as well as between the local 
communities and the government elites who collect the oil rents (Bischoff & Lambrechts, 
2010:59; Obi & Rustad, 2011:2). The growing instability in the region is not aided by the fact 
that there is growing distrust of the government. The conflict in the Niger Delta has been a 
symptom of the more fundamental socio-economic problems that Nigeria continues to face, 
such as inequality and poverty (Barclay, 2013:61). The situation in the Niger Delta has led 
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local groups to changing their method from one of peaceful protest to militant resistance, and 
as such, insurgencies and protests have increased (Obi & Rustad, 2011:3). ―Since 2006, petro-
violence has for strategic, economic and political reasons brought the Niger Delta to the 
forefront of international energy and security concerns‖ (Obi & Rustad, 2011:1).  
The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has been a major force and 
aims to gain control over the resources in the Niger Delta and redistribute the oil wealth. 
MEND has damaged and destroyed oil pipelines, bunkered oil, destroyed oil tankers, 
kidnapped foreign oil workers for ransom, and damaged property. 300 foreign oil workers 
were held hostage during 2006 and 2007 (Watts, 2007:639), and over 895 pipelines were 
vandalised in 2004, this being a huge increase from the 497 pipelines that were damaged in 
1999. MEND has used violence to bring attention to the plight of the local ethnic minorities 
(Obi & Rustad, 2011:3). 2006 saw the height of the violence, with the actions of MEND 
leading to more than 3650 pipelines being vandalised (see Figure 3), over US$1 billion in oil 
reserves being lost and 29 military troops being killed in just three months (Watts, 2007:637).  
Figure 3: Pipeline vandalism (EIA, 2012c:6) 
 
Oil production reached its peak in 2005 with 2.63 million bbl/d being produced. Production 
was then disrupted due to growing tensions in the Niger Delta region. By 2009, oil production 
had decreased by 25% and Presidential Amnesty
9
 was declared. Militants handed over their 
weapons in return for training and cash payments (Rice, 2009). This however has not been as 
                                                          
9
 The 2009 amnesty was aimed at reducing unrest in the Niger Delta, and was a 60-day government offer to 
militants to hand over weapons in return for pardon and cash (Rice, 2009).  
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successful as hoped; there are a number of weapons outstanding and insecurity in the region 
persists (Obi & Rustad, 2011:6). Conflict continues to cost the Nigerian government millions 
of dollars as oil revenue is lost and militancy in the region has continued as the Joint Task 
Force failed to have an impact on regaining order. 
Tensions and unrest remain apparent in the Niger Delta, and as such vandalism and oil 
bunkering still occur. In 2012, Shell reported that between 70 and 200 barrels were stolen 
each day (Kimer, 2012). This continued unrest slows progress and production. The PIB may 
aid the situation but what still remains is a drastic need for security reforms and development 
programmes (Obi & Rustad, 2011:6). As one can see, the Niger Delta and the conflict 
surrounding oil is extremely complex in nature. ―The Niger Delta is the accelerator of this 
vicious merry-go-round, poisoning Nigeria‘s entire political system‖ (Shaxson, 2008:208). 
3.2.5 Conclusion: Nigeria  
Nigeria, with its wealth of human and natural resources make the country attractive to foreign 
investment. Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa and oil holds vast strategic 
importance for the country. The oil and gas industry in Nigeria forms the fiscal basis of 
economic development, making the oil and gas industry and its impact on Nigeria‘s emerging 
market status valuable for analysis. Economics and politics are still very interlinked in 
Nigeria. This, along with its economic dynamism, potential and size make it an emerging 
market. As will be noted, this is also evident in Mexico, which too is considered an emerging 
market. Both Nigeria and Mexico‘s oil and gas industries are huge drivers of economic 
growth, aiding their status as emerging markets. Mexico will now be contextualised. 
3.3 Mexico 
3.3.1 Historical contextualisation of Mexico 
Mexico, formally known as the United Mexican States is made up of 31 states and is a federal 
constitutional republic. The capital is Mexico City. Mexico is bordered by the United States, 
Guatemala, and Belize, along with the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean Sea, and the Pacific 
Ocean. Mexico is 1.96 million square kilometres, making it the fifth largest country in the 
Americas. The main religion is Christianity and the main language spoken is Spanish (BBC 
news, 2013a). The Aztec empire, now Mexico, was defeated by Spain in 1521. Independence 
from Spain was granted in 1821. In 1910 a revolution took place, which led to the current 
constitution being created in 1917.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
35 
 
Politically, Mexico is democratic and follows a federal representative system of government. 
Mexico has a presidential system, whereby the President is the head of state as well as the 
head of government. There are three levels of government; the Federal Union, the State 
governments, and the municipal governments (BBC News, 2013a). Politics in Mexico has 
witnessed the occurrence of a one-party state, being dominated by the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI). The PRI was formed in 1929 and was the party in power from 
1929 until 2000, when the opposition Alliance for Change won the election. The other major 
opposition parties in Mexico are the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and the 
National Action Party (PAN). In 2012, the PRI regained power, promising not to return to its 
authoritarian ways. Enrique Peña Nieto is the leader of the PRI (Thomson, 2012). He won the 
election in July 2012 and was officially elected into Presidential office on 1 December 2012. 
President Peña Nieto wants to see greater reforms, looking towards making the government 
more efficient and Mexico more investor-friendly. The National Development Plan currently 
looks towards achieving five goals; ‗Mexico is peace‘, ‗inclusive Mexico‘, ‗Mexico with 
Educational quality for all‘, ‗Prosperous Mexico‘ and ‗Mexico an actor with global 
responsibility‘ (World Bank, 2013a). 
 
Map 3: Mexico (EIA, 2012b:2) 
 
Mexico is not without its challenges. For example, it has one of the highest kidnapping rates 
in the world, 42.6% of the Mexican population live in poverty, and the murder rate continues 
to climb, this largely being attributed to the exponential growth in organised crime. In 2006, 
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the murder rate was 8 per 100 000 people, in 2013 this rate was 22 per 100 000 people (World 
Bank, 2013a). Mexico‘s biggest challenge is the escalating drug-related violence and crime. 
Drug cartels are said to be a US$13 billion a year business. Former President Felipe Calderon 
launched an attack on the drug cartels in 2006. In reaction the cartels responded with violence, 
and since 2006 over 55,000 people have been killed in drug related violence (BBC news, 
2013a). Still today, organised crime and the impact of drug cartels have a vast influence on 
Mexico and its stability. Violence is most prominent in the northern states of Chihuahua and 
Sinaloa, Guerrero and Michoacán in the south-west, and Veracruz in the south-east (OSAC, 
2013b).  It is an aim of President Peña Nieto to reduce the violence in Mexico by bringing in a 
stronger military presence and special police forces to deal with the problem (Reuters, 2012).  
3.3.2 Mexico as an emerging market 
Mexico has the second largest economy in Latin America. It is considered to be an emerging 
market and has drawn the attention of foreign investors. In the 1990s, Mexico embraced 
globalisation and economic reforms occurred making the economy more liberalised and open. 
Mexico‘s reputation has remained intact through upholding its international commitments and 
maintaining foreign investment in its economy (Bremmer & Keat, 2009:70). Today Mexico is 
considered to be a newly industrialised emerging power, with an upper-middle income status 
(World Bank, 2013a). The manufacturing sector, in specific the automotive industry is a huge 
driver of economic growth, being the eighth largest automotive industry in the world. 
Mexico‘s main trading partner is the US, and Mexico belongs to Organisation for Economic 
cooperation and Development (OECD), as well as the North American Foreign Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) (World Bank, 2013a). 
Mexico has shown resilience during times of economic crisis. When the financial crisis hit in 
2009, Mexico had US$150 million in place to aid against the recession (BBC News, 2013a). 
Since the global financial crisis, Mexico has increased bank loans to the private sector and 
consumer credit has risen. This has enabled Mexico to gain a greater market share, making it 
a true emerging market (Thomson, 2012). Furthermore, its stability and economic policy have 
made it attractive to investors. 
―The mix of higher growth, nearly bullet-proofed macroeconomic fundamentals, expansion of 
credit, and stronger consumer spending has coincided with the relative dulling of Brazil‘s gloss 
as once-impressive growth rates have slowed. That has made international investors look all the 
more closely at Mexico as Latin America‘s brightest prospect in the coming years‖ (Thomson, 
2013).  
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Foreign investment is set to increase if the necessary reforms in the energy sector occur. Such 
reforms will look towards boosting Mexico‘s competitiveness and growth (World Bank, 
2013a). The World Bank (2013a) notes that Mexico‘s ―strong fundamentals, sound policy 
frameworks, and management have resulted in favourable financial conditions that have 
supported national economic activity‖. Since the global recession, foreign investment in 
Mexico has grown (BBC news, 2013a). In the first half of 2010, investment rose nearly 30% 
from a year earlier. According to Alejandro Schtulmann, President of Emerging Market 
Political Risk Analysis
10
 (EMPRA), the fact that Mexico‘s political institutions are still 
transforming make it an emerging market (Personal interview 2, 7 August 2013). 
Mexico has a stable macroeconomic policy, and the finance minister has stated that, 
―economic stability has become state policy. It is an asset, and it is one that nobody 
questions‖ (Meade in Thomson, 2012). Mexico is seen to have great economic potential and 
this potential for accelerating growth is evident when looking at Mexico‘s many factories and 
abundance of skilled and semi-skilled labour which keeps the working environment stable and 
the operating costs low. During 2012, growth was 3.9%. At present the interest rate is 4.5% 
and has been so since July 2009. In 2012, Mexico exported US$349.7 billion worth of goods 
(Thomson, 2012). 
Oil plays a vital role in the Mexican economy, influencing the fiscal stability of the country, 
along with the economic output. In 2011, oil contributed 34% of the total government 
revenue, and 16% of export earnings. However, the tax revenue still relies too heavily on oil, 
as oil contributes one-third of this revenue (BBC News, 2013a). The oil industry, while 
contributing to revenue, is slowing Mexico‘s potential growth. The oil industry in Mexico is 
becoming stagnant and ―the lack of expertise at Pemex and the constitutional ban on private 
investment has resulted in a 25% drop in oil production since 2004‖ (Thomson, 2012). Pemex 
lacks the means to expand the oil sector and stimulate growth. The Head of the Central Bank 
in Mexico states that, ―to achieve higher rates of growth, we need to make progress on 
structural reforms that increase the productivity and competitiveness of the economy‖ 
(Carstens in Thomson, 2012). These necessary reforms need to be seen in the oil and gas 
industry.  
Furthermore, Mexico still witnesses a vast socio-economic gap and investment is not at its 
highest level due to the prevalence of drug-related violence. However, ―on the heels of a 
contentious presidential election and soaring levels of criminal activity, the country‘s political 
                                                          
10 EMPRA is a ―political risk advisory and consulting firm focusing primarily on Mexico‖ (EMPRA, 2013). 
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transition opens the possibility for a new era of reforms and policy changes that could 
drastically improve the country‘s outlook‖ (Schtulmann, 2012).  
3.3.3 History of the oil and gas industry in Mexico 
Mexico is the ninth largest oil producer in the world, and is the third largest in the western 
hemisphere. Oil production in Mexico began in 1901. Between 1910 and 1925 the oil industry 
increased in stature and Britain and the US carved out interests in the industry. However, the 
revenue was sent back to Britain and the US, with Mexico‘s resources continuing to be 
depleted and none of the profits staying in Mexico.  
In 1938 the oil and gas industry in Mexico was nationalised. It is controlled by Pemex, which 
is the country‘s largest company by sales in Mexico. It controls all aspects of the oil sector; 
ownership, exploration, production, transportation and marketing. The Mexican oil industry 
consists of 500 pipelines which cover an area of 3000 miles in the southern part of the 
country. There are six refineries and three export terminals (Oil and Gas in Mexico – Industry 
Profile, 2012). This infrastructure too is controlled solely by Pemex, which has four branches; 
Pemex Exploration and Production, Pemex refining, Pemex gas and basic petrochemicals, and 
Pemex Petrochemicals (Oil and Gas in Mexico – Industry Profile, 2012). It is regulated by the 
Secretaria de Energia (SENER), and additional oversight is provided by the Comision 
Nacional de Hidrocarburos (CNH) (EIA, 2012b:4). The Mexican constitution enforces the 
state-ownership of the oil and gas industry, thus relieving the threat of new entrants. 
However, changes are in motion which will reform the oil and gas industry in Mexico, 
liberalising it and allowing foreign investment (Thomson, 2012).  
The location of the oil reserves is predominantly situated offshore in the Gulf of Mexico in 
the Campeche Basin which is in the southern part of the country. Further oil reserves in the 
south of the country are found in the states; Veracruz, Tabasco and Campeche. There are 
some onshore oil reserves in the northern part of the country. The predominant onshore field 
in the north is Chicontepec, which is situated to the north east of Mexico City. There are said 
to be 442 million barrels of oil reserves situated here (EIA, 2012b:4). 
Mexico and the US have a close trading relationship. This trading relationship extends to 
many sectors but is greatly prevalent in the oil and gas sector where the US imports Mexico‘s 
crude oil, and Mexico imports refined oil products from the US. In 2011, Mexico exported 
1.34 million bbl/d, with 85% of this going to the US. At present Mexico imports most of its 
refined products from the US, but there are hopes to decrease this. In Tula, a new oil refinery 
is being built and it hopes to be operational by 2016. It will have the capacity to refine 300 
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000 bbl/d. In terms of oil production, in 2011, 2.55 million bbl/d were produced, and Mexico 
had 10.2 billion barrels of proven reserves. In 2012 the total revenue for the oil and gas sector 
in Mexico was US$84 billion (Oil and Gas in Mexico – Industry Profile, 2012). 
3.3.4 The Gulf of Mexico 
The majority of Mexico‘s oil is situated in the Gulf of Mexico. The two largest oil fields in 
the country are Cantarell in the south and Ku-Maloob-Zaap (KMZ) in the north-eastern region 
of the Gulf of Mexico (see Figure 4). These fields produce what is known as the Maya blend 
of crude oil which is heavier, while the oil found off-shore of the Tabasco state are lighter 
blends known as Isthmus and Olmega (EIA, 2012b:12). Production in the Cantarell field 
began in 1979 and this field is one of the largest in the world. Oil production in the Cantarell 
field peaked in 2004 at 2.1 million bbl/d and at the time the Cantarell field was producing 
63% of Mexico‘s oil. In 2011 it produced only 500,000 bbl/d, while KMZ produced 860,000 
bbl/d (EIA, 2012b: 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Mexican oil production by field (EIA, 2012b:6) 
While the majority of instability and insecurity in Mexico is found in the northern states, 
insecurity is apparent in Veracruz, which is located in the southern oil region of Mexico. 
There have been incidences of oil being stolen from pipelines and fuel trucks, and this theft 
costs Pemex millions of dollars per year (Oil and Gas in Mexico – Industry Profile, 2012). 
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Oil production in Mexico has been decreasing since 2004 (see Figure 5) and it is said that oil 
production could become stagnant, with output remaining at 2.8 million bbl/d until at least 
2030 if changes are not made and foreign investment does not occur within the oil and gas 
industry (Key political risks to watch in Mexico, 2012). This decline will continue, unless 
reforms can occur which will change policy and enable technological expertise. This, along 
with funding will most likely come about through the entry of foreign firms. The slump in oil 
production could see Mexico becoming a net oil importer by the end of the decade. At present 
Mexico already imports 40% of its gasoline (Petroleum Economist, 2013). Furthermore, the 
government relies too heavily on the oil revenues. The government takes the majority of the 
revenue leaving Pemex with not enough funding to expand and grow its technology. This 
flow of revenue is also affected by the fluctuating price of oil (Trotta & Hughes, 2012). The 
energy sector is ailing; however, Mexico still holds vast potential and reforms are vital so that 
this oil potential can be realised. 
 
Figure 5: Mexico’s oil production and consumption (EIA, 2012b:3) 
3.3.5 Conclusion: Mexico 
Mexico‘s economy is the second largest in Latin America and holds vast potential. It‘s 
resilience to the economic crisis and strong macroeconomic foundation has brought Mexico to 
the attention of foreign investors. However, organised crime, the incessant violence caused by 
drug cartels, and the widening socio-economic gap continue to hinder Mexico‘s ability and 
outlook.  
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Mexico is the ninth largest oil producer in the world and oil profits contribute one-third of 
government revenue. Until recently the oil and gas industry has been state-owned and 
controlled by Pemex. However, current government reforms are looking towards liberalising 
the oil and gas sector, with the aim of increasing foreign investment and bringing in needed 
expertise and funding to assist Mexico‘s ailing energy sector.  
3.4 Conclusion 
Nigeria and Mexico are emerging markets. They have BRIC-like potential, large population 
sizes, and the ability to experience positive momentum. This, along with their vast amount of 
human and natural resources, place Nigeria and Mexico in a prosperous economic position. A 
historical contextualisation was provided for both countries, along with looking at the oil and 
gas industries and their specific features in Nigeria and Mexico. The oil and gas industry is a 
lucrative sector and forms an essential part of the economy and its growth in both Nigeria and 
Mexico. The oil profits contribute to government revenue and export earnings. The majority 
of oil in Nigeria is found in the Niger Delta, while in Mexico oil is found in the Gulf of 
Mexico. In both Nigeria and Mexico, changes could be made which would improve the 
efficiency of the oil and gas sector. In Nigeria, instability caused by tensions between the 
government, the TNOCs and local communities needs to be curbed, while in Mexico the oil 
and gas sector is in need of reform, so to allow the entry of foreign oil companies and their 
technological expertise. 
 
The importance and relevance of political risk has grown, with globalisation and the rapid 
growth of emerging markets bringing with it not only prosperity, but also volatility. There is 
an increasing need to consider emerging market behaviour and the political risks faced by 
foreign investors wanting to invest in the oil and gas industry. This chapter has provided the 
foundation from which to move towards chapter four, which will look at finding and 
presenting the main political risk factors faced by Nigeria and Mexico in their oil and gas 
industries. Thereafter the essential generic political risk factors that face the oil and gas 
industry in emerging markets, those that investors should be aware of when looking to invest 
in the oil and gas industry in emerging markets, will be presented. 
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CHAPTER FOUR – ESSENTIAL GENERIC POLITICAL RISK 
FACTORS FOR THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY IN EMERGING 
MARKETS 
4.1 Introduction 
In a tense geo-political world and the current global-economic context, emerging markets are 
playing an increasingly larger role. Furthermore, as energy demands grow throughout the 
world, the oil and gas rich nations have been placed in the spotlight. Many of these oil rich 
nations are politically highly volatile and their hydrocarbon supply is considered unstable; this 
brings increased political risk. When looking at the oil and gas industry in emerging markets, 
it is important to note that identification, analysis and mitigation of political risk is an 
essential requirement for TNOCs, in order for their assets to be protected and for investment 
to be successful (Bischoff & Lambrechts, 2011:61).  
 
This chapter examines the political risk factor selection process before moving on to discuss 
the case studies. The case of Nigeria will then be looked at and the essential political risk 
factors which need to be considered by investors, wanting to invest in the oil and gas industry 
in Nigeria will be discussed. Mexico will then be looked at in the same manner, with the key 
political risk factors being analysed. After having addressed the essential political risk factors 
in Nigeria and Mexico, a generic list of political risk factors for emerging markets will be 
determined. These political risk factors will be the most salient elements which investors need 
to consider before choosing to invest in the oil and gas industry in emerging markets. Finally, 
political risk mitigation will be briefly discussed, providing an overview of how political risk 
in the oil and gas industry in emerging markets can be reduced.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
43 
 
4.2 Selection process of essential political risk factors 
 
 
Figure 6 –Process of political risk factor selection 
As explained in chapter one, the aim of this research study is to compile a generic list of risk 
factors. Emerging markets serve as the principal concept which drives this generic list. As a 
sub-category the case studies are utilised to complete this list of generic risk factors, within 
the context of the oil and gas industry. The political risk factors discussed in this chapter were 
compiled through a process which will now be explained (see Figure 6). The first step in 
identifying the political risk factors was finding reputable sources from which to gather a 
series of relevant political risk factors. The sources from which the political risks were 
gathered were the following: Control Risks‘11 Risk Map Report 2013, Red24‘s12 Threat 
Forecast 2013, Stratfor
13, the Overseas Security Advisory Council‘s14 (OSAC) Crime and 
Safety reports, Frynas & Mellahi, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies
15
 (CSIS), 
World Risk Review, Harary Security Consulting International
16
, BBC News Country Profiles 
and articles by Thomson from Emerging Markets.org. As can be noted, the sources were 
                                                          
11
 Control Risks is ―an independent, global risk consultancy specialising in helping organisations manage 
political, integrity and security risks in complex and hostile environments‖ (Control Risks, 2013:S2). 
12
 Red24 is a ―crisis management assistance company delivering a range of products and services to businesses, 
organisations and individuals around the world‖ (Red24, 2013a). 
13
 Stratfor is ―a geopolitical intelligence firm that provides strategic analysis and forecasting to individuals and 
organizations around the world‖ (Stratfor, 2013a). 
14
 OSAC ―provides security cooperation between America private sector interests and worldwide and the U.S. 
Department of State‖ (OSAC, 2013a). 
15
 CSIS is an organisation which provides ―strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions‖ (CSIS, 2013).  
16
 Harary Security Consulting International is a leading security firm in Mexico (Harary Systems, 2013). 
Step 1: Gathered 
reputable sources 
Step 2: A list  of 
political risks, 
mentioned by these 
sources was compiled 
Step 3: The list was 
narrowed down to the 
political risks that were 
mentioned the most 
Step 4: Essential 
political risks for both 
Nigeria and Mexico 
were established 
Step 5: The correlating 
risks were determined  
Step 6: The final generic 
list of essential political 
risks was created 
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company reports from notable risk companies and articles from prominent news agencies. 
These sources were chosen because they all discuss and analyse political risk for the years 
2012 and 2013. This makes them both current and relevant. The one exception was the use of 
Frynas & Mellahi. Their journal article titled, Political Risks as Firm-Specific 
(Dis)advantages: Evidence on Transnational Oil Firms in Nigeria was published in 2003. 
While not current, the information contained in this article is still relevant, since the article 
presents a coherent analysis of political risks facing the oil and gas industry in Nigeria, which 
correlates to a part of this research study‘s focus.   
These sources and the information obtained from them was complemented by primary data 
gained through Skype interviews with Alejandro Schtulmann, the President of EMPRA who 
was able to provide information on Mexico (Personal interview 1, 7 August 2013), as well as 
a senior oil executive from ExxonMobil
17
, a top TNOC operating in Nigeria (Personal 
interview 2, 16 August 2013). These two respondents were able to provide current and 
relevant information and expert knowledge regarding political risk for both Nigeria and 
Mexico.  
Step two involved compiling a list of all the political risks the sources stated and then taking 
into consideration how these impacted on three levels; the emerging market level, the national 
level and more specifically the oil and gas industry. This list showed all applicable political 
risks for Nigeria and Mexico and which sources found them to be important. It is essential to 
note that the political risks were case-specific. There were risks found that only Nigeria had, 
while there were also risks that only related to Mexico. The aim was to find where the lists of 
political risks overlapped in order to establish a generic list that can be applied to all emerging 
markets. The political risks identified for Nigeria were: civil war, changes in government 
policy, corruption, kidnapping, extortion, disputes with neighbouring countries, social 
tensions, Islamic militancy, government reforms, political unrest and political instability. The 
political risks identified for Mexico were: drug-related violence, kidnapping, extortion, 
organised crime, civil unrest, energy reform, currency changes and political instability. Step 
three involved placing aside those political risks that had been mentioned by the most number 
of sources and thus had received the most attention. In doing this, some similarly worded 
political risks were able to be linked to come up with more comprehensively worded political 
risk factors.  
                                                          
17
 ExxonMobil is the ―world's largest publicly traded international oil and gas company‖ (ExxonMobil, 2013). 
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The final lists of essential political risks in the oil and gas industries in Nigeria and Mexico 
were then collated in step four using those risks that had been set aside in the previous step. 
The six political risks for Nigeria are: government reforms, civil war, political instability, 
social tensions, corruption and kidnapping. The five political risks for Mexico are: drug 
related violence, kidnapping and extortion, energy reform, civil unrest and political 
instability.  
Nigeria and Mexico provided suitable case studies of emerging markets as well as providing 
cases which exhibited industry-specific political risks affecting the oil and gas industry. With 
the lists produced for both Nigeria and Mexico, step five involved finding the political risks 
that Nigeria and Mexico had in common. This was done by considering where the lists of 
political risks overlapped. With the correlating variables found, the final generic list could 
then be compiled. The six political risks that are essential for investors to consider are: 
government reform affecting the energy sector, political instability, kidnapping, internal 
violence, civil unrest and corruption.  
Corruption was an exception as it was a political risk factor that did not correlate between the 
lists of Nigeria and Mexico. It was not a stated political risk for Mexico; however, corruption 
in Mexico still rates relatively high on Transparency International‘s Corruption Perceptions 
Index
18
, 105 out of 174 countries. Upon a general reading on emerging market political risk, 
corruption comes up regularly and is considered too important to be excluded from the 
generic list of essential political risks for the oil and gas industry in emerging markets. 
4.3 Nigeria 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Nigeria has witnessed great turmoil, conflict and instability over the years, and issues such as 
corruption, poor infrastructure, ethnic tensions, and economic inequality have restrained 
growth in Nigeria (Barclay, 2013:57). As Africa‘s largest country by population, its actions 
and behaviour exhibit increasing power in the geo-political environment in which emerging 
markets are gaining influence. Nigeria, being an emerging market, along with having an 
active oil and gas industry, makes it attractive to foreign investment. When looking at Nigeria 
on a macro level and micro level in terms of the oil and gas industry, as well as taking into 
consideration its status as an emerging market, six essential political risk factors which 
TNOCs should be made aware of become apparent. These six political risk factors will now 
be analysed below. 
                                                          
18
 Refer to Appendix A for Transparency International‘s 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index report. 
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4.3.2 Political Risk factors in the oil and gas industry in Nigeria 
4.3.2.1 Government reforms 
The investment landscape and business climate in Nigeria will be dramatically influenced by 
government reforms and their implementation (Barclay, 2013:58). Government reforms in 
Nigeria have so far been steady, yet slow and President Goodluck Jonathan needs to prove 
himself against a growing tide of dissatisfaction from civilians in the northern region of 
Nigeria, along with growing internal pressure as the threat of Boko Haram grows and the 
government fails to successfully manage the insurgency (Red24, 2013b:26). Reforms have 
looked towards increasing investment with a focus on diversification and the growth of non-
oil and gas sectors (Aribisala, 2013).  
Historically Nigeria has not always been as liberalised as it is today. The 1970s saw 
nationalisation and expropriation occur in Nigeria. These were seen as tools for achieving 
political-economic objectives without foreign nationals impeding economic development 
(Banwo & Ighodalo, 2011). Anti-foreign laws were put in place which restricted foreign 
investment and in turn aimed at increasing state control over the oil resources (Frynas & 
Mellahi, 2003:550). The government acquired equity stakes in the TNOCs and by 1979 the 
government had a 60% ownership share of the major TNOCs in the Nigerian oil industry. 
Today the TNOCs and the government have JVs; however, the TNOCs have still been able to 
experience effective control over their production due to technological expertise and funding 
which the government cannot provide. 
The current reforms which relate to the oil and gas industry are the sovereign wealth fund, the 
fuel subsidy and the PIB. The sovereign wealth fund aims to provide long term stability; 
however, critics state that instead of money going into this fund, it should be injected back 
into the country to aid with building much-needed infrastructure (Rundell, 2011). A fuel 
subsidy has existed for many years in Nigeria, allowing fuel to cost US$0.40 a litre in the 
country. This subsidy is seen by the public to be a benefit of living in an oil-rich country; 
however, Nigeria still has to import most of its fuel due to the lack of refinery infrastructure. 
On 1 January 2012, the government withdrew the subsidy as it was costing the government 
US$7.6 billion a year. This led to a vast public outcry and an eight-day national strike. Two 
weeks after the subsidy was withdrawn, a partial subsidy was reinstated making fuel US$0.60 
per litre (EIA, 2012c:5). In August 2012, tensions over the fuel subsidy arose once more when 
Nigerian oil marketing associations began strikes to protest over unpaid subsidies (EIA, 
2012c:5). 
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Perhaps the greatest reform at present to affect the oil and gas industry is the PIB which is 
likely to be passed soon. In terms of revenue, oil rents currently go to the NNPC. The PIB 
will aim to break up the NNPC‘s monopoly so that more oil revenue gets put into the 
Nigerian central bank which will, in turn, boost the economy and development of Nigeria‘s 
citizens. The PIB will also encourage greater foreign investment in the oil and gas sector, with 
the aim of boosting the Nigerian economy further and demonstrating its global status as an 
emerging market. The PIB will bring about necessary clarity; however, it will not aid in 
dealing efficiently with continued corruption and dysfunction in the oil and gas sector. The 
PIB will be met with slow and uneven implementation (Control Risks, 2013:88). Generally 
government reforms will bring some changes to the oil and gas industry; however, the 
structural flaws will not be addressed, and the inflow of foreign investment that the PIB 
strives to bring about will be more subdued that expected (Barclay, 2013:61). 
4.3.2.2 Civil war 
Foreign investors have dealt with a considerable number of political risks in Nigeria over the 
years including civil war and the ensuing effects it has. The civil war broke out in 1967 after a 
military coup overthrew the First Republic in 1966. This occurred due to tensions between the 
Biafran regime in the south–eastern region of Nigeria and the federal regime based in Lagos. 
The war ended in 1970, leaving over a million people dead (Lewis, 2011:2). It was deemed 
one of the ―most threatening political events of Nigeria‘s history‖ (Frynas & Mellahi, 
2003:548). The war disrupted onshore oil operations, with oil production declining during that 
time, from 420,000 bbl/d to 145,000 bbl/d (Frynas & Mellahi, 2003:548). However, offshore 
oil production was insulated during the civil war from onshore political disorder and having 
offshore resources was one way in which the political risk relating to the civil war was 
mitigated.  
Civil war has not erupted again in Nigeria; however, it is necessary to consider the political, 
economic and social atmosphere before investing in the oil and gas region of the Niger Delta. 
Not only are the constant ethnic tensions and the growing north-south divide a point of 
concern, but so too is the fact that Nigeria has a growing number of unemployed youths who 
could turn militant. Currently the youth unemployment rate is 38% (The Nigerian Voice, 
2013). Considering Nigeria‘s tumultuous history relating to coups and militancy, the 
possibility of civil war remains and therefore needs to be considered as a political risk in 
Nigeria. 
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4.3.2.3 Political instability 
Political instability for the purpose of this research study can be conceptualised as volatility 
within the political system, focussing on the government and its officials. Political instability 
has been evident in Nigeria and affects the country on a macro scale.  An example is the fact 
that since independence was granted in 1960, Nigeria has witnessed five successful military 
coups
19
. Federalism in Nigeria has led to a lack of government cohesion and has emphasised 
the differences between regions (Lewis, 2011:5). The lack of a strong central government has 
led to poor governance, weak and delayed decision making, a lack of legitimacy and 
accountability, weak institutions and idleness in the government bureaucracies.  
Political instability has increased as credibility in the government has declined. Government 
credibility has been tainted by fraud and corruption, as there is continued misconduct by 
government elites (Lewis, 2011:7). In Nigeria, patronage and identity politics are evident, and 
the President Jonathan administration is said to have an agenda that, ―is not an economic one 
but a political one that is informed by the logic of rent and patronage‖ (Kaplan, 2011). 
President Jonathan has received a great deal of criticism and has struggled to gain consensus 
from the population in the Northern regions of Nigeria. He has attempted to produce support 
in the North through the use of money by issuing lucrative government contracts (Kaplan, 
2011). While patronage distribution has suppressed some civilian unrest, it does not get to the 
root cause of societal problems. On a national level patronage could further increase as the 
2015 elections approach, and President Jonathan looks for re-election and the PDP 
endeavours to maintain its political power (Lewis, 2011:7).  
Political competition is a powerful catalyst for instability. Instability increases during election 
time due to the weakness of electoral rules. The onset of intimidation, propaganda, violence 
and fraud occur in order to secure votes and win the election (Lewis, 2011:12). This was 
evident in the last national elections. General Muhammadu Buhari who comes from the north 
was Goodluck Jonathan‘s main opponent in the 2011 elections. Voting showed a clear divide; 
the North voting for Buhari and the South voting for Jonathan. The announcement of 
Goodluck Jonathan as President was met with violence and protests in some northern regions 
(BBC News, 2013b). According to Human Rights Watch (2011), 800 people were left dead 
and 65,000 displaced after communal violence in 12 of the northern states. There is an 
unwritten pact in Nigeria that leadership rotates between northern and southern leaders (Agoi 
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 January 1966, July 1966, July 1975, December 1983, and August 1985 (BBC News, 1999). 
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& Smith, 2013). The 2015 elections will see increased political tension if there is no rotation 
to a Muslim leader. 
The PDP is seen to aid elite interests from certain ethnic southerly regions, while areas of the 
north remain overwhelmed by poverty (Barclay, 2013:59). According to the Control Risks‘  
‗Risk Map report 2013‘ (2013:60), ―the PDP will experience increased internal friction and 
disunity in 2013 as interest groups begin repositioning themselves with one eye on the 2015 
elections‖. Political instability can be a catalyst for other political risks such as political 
discontent. A political risk such as this will lead to greater social tensions in Nigeria. 
4.3.2.4 Social tensions 
In Nigeria social tensions are deep-rooted and entrenched. These in part are due to the strong 
ethnic and cultural ties of a very diverse and heterogeneous population. Tensions have led to 
various forms of ethnic rebellion and clashes, as friction between the groups persists (El-
Choueiry et al., 2013:2). The Nigerian people long for better circumstances; however, the 
enigma remains…Despite the vast oil wealth and economic growth, poverty is increasing 
each year (Kale in Brock, 2012). Civil unrest and strikes regarding poor service delivery will 
remain so long as a great deal of the population is poverty stricken. Political discontent is a 
predominant factor which leads to social tension and arises from the elite as well as the 
grassroots level (Barclay, 2013:59). This is clear when looking at the north-south divide and 
the underlying socio-economic problems which have led to it. The gulf between the North and 
South is growing, due in part to the wealth disparity evident (see Figure 7) (BBC News Africa, 
2012). This gulf is not aided by the fact that ―the President leans more towards appeasing his 
southern support base than extending the olive branch to the north‖ (Barclay, 2013:60). The 
North feels marginalised and has not accepted the presidency of Goodluck Jonathan as he 
might have hoped.  
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Figure 7: Wealth Disparity in Nigeria (BBC News Africa, 2012) 
The North-South divide further widened when Islamic law was imposed on many of the 
northern states. The growing Islamic sentiment and the actions of Boko Haram have led to 
mounting militancy in the north of the country (Barclay, 2013:58). Boko Haram is an Islamic 
group, seen to be an al-Qaeda ally that is dedicated to the spread of Sharia law (El-Choueiry 
et al., 2013:1). The group, who began their activities in 2002, are seen to be the main threat to 
political stability in Nigeria (Global Security, 2013). Their activities are part of the Northern 
effort to lay the foundations of an Islamic, theocratic state (Global Security, 2013). One of 
their aims is to destabilise the country and they have conducted a number of attacks in the 
north of the country. After attacks by Boko Haram in 2004, it was reported that at least 57,000 
people fled their homes in central and northern Nigeria (Global Security, 2013). Boko Haram 
attack Christian minorities, which has led to a cycle of violence and retribution between 
Muslims and Christians (Barclay, 2013:60). In January 2012, 100 people were killed in Kano 
after Boko Haram told Christians to leave the north. In December 2012, a further 20 
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Christians were killed during the Christmas period (BBC News, 2013b). Boko Haram
20
 and 
the growing number of their militant attacks is just, ―one symptom of a wider social, 
economic and political problem that is finding its outlet in religious radicalism‖ (Barclay, 
2013:59).  
Security risks for foreign operators in Nigeria, due to the Islamist militancy present, are set to 
evolve and grow (Barclay, 2013:57). Boko Haram is seen as a growing threat to human 
safety. In 2012, more than 600 people were killed through Boko Haram attacks; this was more 
than any previous year (Red24, 2013b:25). In 2012, 19 of Nigeria‘s 36 states were subject to 
Boko Haram attacks (see Figure 8) (Stratfor, 2012), and there has been evidence of the group 
expanding its operations, moving further and further away from their traditional geographic 
location (Red24, 2013b:25). In May 2013, the President deployed military troops into the 
northern states of Yobe, Borno and Adamawa and declared a state of emergency (BBC News, 
2013b). The activities of Boko Haram remain hard to detect and their attacks are becoming 
more sophisticated.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Boko Haram Attacks from 2009 to July 2012 (Stratfor, 2012) 
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 The increase in Boko Haram activities correlates with a growing increase in Islamic militancy throughout 
Africa. This is clear from the 21 September 2013 attack on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya. The 
siege lasted 80 hours and left more than 200 people wounded and at least 67 people dead (Howden, 2013). 
Although this attack was committed by the Somalia-based al-Shabaab group and not Boko Haram, it is a clear 
indication of increasing Islamic militancy and growing regional instability in Central, Western and Eastern 
Africa.   
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Resources are a further instigator of social tension. Poverty and the lack of economic 
opportunity lead to greater competition over resources, in particular those of oil and gas 
(Lewis, 2011:10). Social tensions have led to violence and anti-oil protests, with local 
communities using oil as the issue and outlet to make their voices heard. This is especially 
apparent in the oil-rich southern region of Nigeria (Lewis, 2011:2). The Niger Delta region 
has been the location of considerable conflict over the years. The Ogani minority were the 
first to start localised protests with activism then increasing to the Urhobo, Itsekiri and Ijaw 
groups during the 1990s. 
The activities of MEND in the Niger Delta and their attacks on foreign firms have been 
devastating to oil industry profits. Violent attacks on oil production sites have decreased since 
the amnesty in 2009 with the government having, ―effectively bought off a generation of 
militants‖ (Barclay, 2013:61). Theft however has increased as former MEND individuals 
continue to engage in violence and abductions and armed gangs continue to steal oil (Lewis, 
2011:10; OSAC, 2013c). ExxonMobil considers the actions of both Boko Haram and MEND 
to be of major concern for oil and gas operations in Nigeria (Personal interview 2, 16 August 
2013). As with most issues in Nigeria, the underlying causes remain unaddressed and 
profitable incentives for criminal activities continue. Until the fundamental problems are 
solved, the Niger Delta will continue to be a complex and hostile environment in which to 
operate (Barclay, 2013:61). 
4.3.2.5 Corruption 
Corruption is a complex phenomenon and receives considerable attention as a political risk 
factor. It takes place on various levels and can occur in many ways. As such, the lines can 
become blurred, making it challenging to differentiate between actual corruption and 
favouritism for example. Corrupt activities are carried out for personal gain, for instance, the 
demanding of a bribe, whereas favouritism does not result in a direct personal benefit, such as 
government officials promoting the interests of their tribe (UN, 2004:23). The notion of 
corruption is further complicated, ―where a society has long-standing traditions of gift-giving 
unconnected to expectations of special or improper treatment‖ (UN, 2004:28). There are 
different types of corruption and therefore corruption can be conceptualised in several ways. 
Transparency International (2013) defines corruption as, ―the misuse of entrusted power for 
private gain‖, and the United Nations (UN) defines corruption as, ―commission or omission of 
an act in the performance of or in connection with one‘s duties, in response to gifts, promises 
or incentives demanded or accepted, or the wrongful receipt of these once the act has been 
committed or omitted‖ (UN, 2004:23). Jessen (2012:40) offers an industry-specific definition 
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and defines corruption in the oil and gas industry as, ―the use of public office for private gains 
accrued from the oil and gas investor‖. This illustrates an abuse of power by government 
officials and relates to activities such as the soliciting of bribes, receiving of special payments 
and embezzlement (UN, 2004:23).  
Corruption is hard to detect but in Nigeria it is believed to be widespread. According to 
Red24, there are high levels of corruption in both the government and the military (2013b:25). 
Corruption occurs due to a lack of ‗a sense of national community‘, enforcement mechanisms, 
changing moral codes, wealth inequality and the idea that political office will lead one to vast 
wealth (Fagbadebo, 2007:30). Corruption is evident on a macro scale in Nigeria but affects 
the oil and gas industry on the micro level too. According to OSAC (2012c), in 2012 
corruption remained widespread in Nigeria. The corruption perception index, conducted by 
Transparency International, looks at how corrupt a country‘s public sector is perceived to be. 
Scores range from zero (highly corrupt) to 100 (very ‗clean‘). In 2012, Nigeria ranked 139 out 
of 176 countries, receiving a score of 27 out of 100 (Transparency International, 2013)
21
. 
Corruption occurs on many levels. One form of corruption is patronage. Patron-client 
relationships present a risk as they take prevalence over the more formal aspects of politics, 
such as rule of law, a reliable electoral system, and respectable political parties (Fagbedebo, 
2007:28). Godfathers are those notable local elites who are known to appoint election 
candidates through providing the necessary resources to ensure election victory for their 
chosen candidates (Lewis, 2011:8). ―Political competition is organised around personalities 
and parochial appeals, which are typically pursued through the use of money, intimidation 
and the compromise of election authorities‖ (Lewis, 2011:8).  Corruption has also aided 
conflict, with the military and government being implicated in corruption scandals in Nigeria 
(Red24, 2013b). There is wasteful public spending, and while President Jonathan has vowed 
to tackle corruption and governance issues, curbing it will be a vast challenge in a federal 
system of governance. In 2011 he fired the anti-corruption agency head stating that she was 
not conducting her duties and tackling the problem (BBC News, 2013b).  
Corruption is a common occurrence that has become entrenched. Corruption by government 
officials erodes the rule of law, affects investor confidence and impacts economic stability 
(UN, 2004:23). Nuhu Ribadu, former head of the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission, believes that corruption has cost Nigeria US$450 billion over the past decade 
(The Economist, 2013a). Many laws are in place to try and curb corruption, however, these 
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are not adequately enforced (Global Integrity, 2013). Government funds are viewed as open 
access goods and public office holders, ―prefer to risk jail for embezzlement of public funds 
entrusted to their care rather than risk opprobrium in their home areas for failing to enrich 
themselves and their communities during their time at the public trough‖ (Global Security, 
2013). 
Natural resources are susceptible to corruption and plundering, as local officials seek 
economic opportunism. Investors are exposed to interference by the government as elite 
interests outweigh licensing and public procurement. Officials take bribes when giving out 
contracts and thus many contracts are signed by corrupt leaders. Corruption affects foreign 
firms when they have to pay the government for preferential access in order to gain contracts 
and other political favours (The Economist, 2013b:55). There is not only corruption on the 
part of government officials, but on the part of the TNOCs too, and the way they conduct their 
business. Ethics play an important role in a TNOC and a company needs to resist participating 
in corrupt activities and rather ensure that their reputation and ethical integrity remains intact. 
The TNOC should try and raise standards in the country they are invested in (The Economist, 
2008). However, companies increasingly face ethical dilemmas with regards to the acceptable 
level of risk, dealing with impropriety and the way they conduct themselves in unstable 
places.  
Corruption presents a political risk for TNOCs wanting to invest in the oil and gas industry. It 
is an issue that affects the country on a macro scale and reveals a huge abuse of power. 
Nigeria requires a ―psychological reorientation away from corruption and towards meaningful 
development‖ (Fagbadebo, 2007:35). Dealing in the energy industry is complex and during an 
interview with the Economist, Cory Harvey of Control Risks remarked that, ―energy 
transactions in difficult places can be spectacularly complex, making it hard to gauge the 
acceptable level of risk. Nigeria is arguably the most complex environment of all‖ (The 
Economist, 2013b:55).  
4.3.2.6 Kidnapping  
For the purpose of this research study, kidnapping will be conceptualised as the kidnapping of 
foreign nationals from oil and gas operations. This is done with a specific aim in mind; to 
acquire a ransom which will supplement the criminal group‘s income, for a criminal group to 
gain attention due to the highly publicised nature of foreign national kidnapping, or as a form 
of protest against the TNOC for which the foreign national works. Within Africa kidnapping 
is most prevalent in Nigeria and Somalia. The official number of kidnapping incidents is 
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under-reported (OSAC, 2013c), but the African Insurance Organisation has claimed that a 
quarter of global kidnappings for ransom take place in Nigeria (Red24, 2013b:27).  
Kidnapping is more prolific in the Niger Delta; however, during 2012 it spread to other parts 
of Nigeria, specifically the northern regions where Boko Haram have claimed responsibility. 
Along with Boko Haram, other Islamic terrorist groups, namely ‗Ansaru‘ and ‗Al-Qaida in 
the lands beyond the Sahel‘ have arisen in Nigeria and claimed responsibility for a number of 
attacks (see Figure 9) (Risk Advisory, 2013). A highly publicised incident in the North was 
the kidnapping and killing of a British construction worker and his Italian colleague. Chris 
McManus and Franco Lamolinara were kidnapped in May 2011 and held until they were 
killed in March 2012 (Hills, 2013). ‗Al-Qaida in the lands beyond the Sahel‘ claimed 
responsibility for the attack. In April 2013 two Russian and two Ukrainian oil workers were 
kidnapped off the coast of Bayelsa State. They were rescued by Nigerian police a month later. 
MEND claimed responsibility for the kidnappings (Oil and Gas Industry‘s Top 5 Kidnapping 
Hotspots, 2013). 
 
Figure 9: Islamic terrorist activity (Risk Advisory, 2013) 
Foreign nationals from both onshore and offshore oil facilities have been kidnapped for 
ransom; however, there are growing incidents of kidnappings and piracy off-shore. Piracy in 
the Gulf of Guinea is primarily attributed to the violence and instability apparent in the Niger 
Delta region. The pirates are said to be those who did not benefit from the Presidential 
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amnesty in 2009. These individuals have thus resorted to kidnapping and piracy for income 
(Red24, 2013b:32). Between January and the end of November in 2012 there were 45 piracy 
incidents reported in the Gulf of Guinea
22
 (Red24, 2013b:32). The Niger Delta pirates target 
ships and kidnap the foreign nationals on board for ransom. There have been incidents where 
entire oil installations have been taken hostage on the condition that a ransom is paid by the 
authorities (Red24, 2013b:32). In December 2012 personnel consisting of four foreigners and 
two Nigerians from the South Korean company Hyundai were kidnapped off the coast of 
Bayelsa State (BBC News Africa, 2013). In the most recent incident at the time of writing, two 
American citizens were kidnapped by pirates from an oil supply vessel off the coast of 
Nigeria on 23 October 2013. The vessel belongs to US-based oil servicing company Edison 
Chouset Offshore. The victims were the ship‘s captain and chief engineer (Gladstone, 2013). 
4.3.3 Conclusion 
When looking at political risk from both a macro and micro level and keeping it in the context 
of emerging markets, there are six political risk factors which are essential for TNOCs to 
consider before choosing to invest in the oil and gas industry in Nigeria. These are: 
government reforms, civil war, political instability, social tensions, corruption and 
kidnapping. 
Government reforms are not only applicable when looking at emerging markets, but are also 
of concern to the oil and gas industry. They will bring about structural changes, some of 
which will relate to foreign investment. Civil war has occurred before in Nigeria and may 
occur again as economic potential will not disguise the severe political and socio-economic 
challenges for long. Political instability in Nigeria is present due to poor governance, a lack of 
accountability and fierce political competition.  Social tensions are increasing and relate to the 
growing north-south divide and ethnic and religious clashes. The social tensions are a 
symptom of the larger problems that exist in the political, economic and societal realms of 
Nigeria. Corruption in Nigeria is a widespread political risk that affects the country on a 
macro scale and undermines progress in Nigeria (Barclay, 2013:57). Kidnapping is prolific in 
Nigeria when looking at Africa and this presents a risk to the safety of personnel. Having 
looked at Nigeria as an emerging market and the political risks it presents TNOCs, Mexico 
will now be looked at, with discussion centering on its political risk factors.  
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 Piracy off the coast of Nigeria declined after the Nigerian Presidential amnesty in 2009, but it is on the rise 
again. At the time of writing, the latest report released by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) on 17 
October 2013 shows a general rise in West Africa piracy, especially off the Gulf of Guinea which includes the 
waters off Nigeria, Benin, Togo and parts of Ghana. In the first three quarters of 2013, there were 40 pirate 
attacks, 34 crew kidnappings and 132 crew members taken hostage in the Gulf of Guinea. Off the coast of 
Nigeria, there were 29 piracy incidents and 32 crew kidnappings (IMB, 2013). 
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4.4 Mexico 
4.4.1 Introduction 
Mexico receives global attention due to the continual unrest and violence caused by drug-
related activities. However, Mexico also receives attention due to its strong economy and 
sound macro-economic principles. In the global setting, Mexico exhibits power as an 
emerging market. The latest government reforms surrounding the energy sector, along with 
the fact that Mexico is the ninth largest oil producer in the world, make it attractive to foreign 
investment. Considering the oil and gas industry in an emerging market such as Mexico, five 
essential political risk factors are apparent: drug related violence and organised crime, 
kidnapping and extortion, energy reform, civil unrest and political instability. These five 
political risk factors will now be analysed.   
4.4.2 Political Risk factors in the oil and gas industry in Mexico     
4.4.2.1 Drug related violence 
Drug-related violence is seen by Red24 to be Mexico‘s biggest political risk for 2013. It is a 
US$13bn per year business and it will take a great deal to disrupt the cartels activities in 
Mexico. The situation presents a grave challenge for the Mexican government. Drug-related 
crime and violence affect Mexico on a macro scale and this has repercussions for the oil and 
gas industry as well as the TNOCs that operate in the country.  
In Mexico the greatest drug related violence occurs not only between the cartels themselves 
but also due to infighting between the cartels and law enforcement (Red24, 2013b:7). The 
biggest battle is the conflict between the two largest cartels, the Sinaloa and the Los Zetas 
Cartels. They are continuously on the offensive and fighting for greater influence and power. 
Their attacks on one another are bold and violent. Los Zetas lost their leader, Heriberto 
Lazcano in October 2012 when he was killed by the Mexican Navy but they have remained a 
force in Mexico. Drug cartels also launch attacks on government officials. These attacks 
include ambushes, assaults, kidnappings, home invasions, and assassinations (Harary Security 
Consulting International, 2013:2). The cartels intimidate law enforcement officers in an 
attempt to stop them from conducting their jobs. Furthermore, if an official joins a cartel, this 
official is then at risk of being assaulted by a rival cartel (Harary Security Consulting 
International, 2013:2). Many law enforcement officials have been corrupted by the cartels and 
drawn into their criminal undertakings (Stratfor, 2013c). For example, local police in 
Tamaulipas were found to have ties with local cartels, leading to the already over-extended 
military having to step in (Harary Security Consulting International, 2013:1). These cartel 
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activities decrease the overall effectiveness of law enforcement and make the actions of law 
enforcement officials unreliable. 
Violence has so far been contained to certain areas within Mexico. The violence may, 
however, disperse to more localised areas with smaller groups committing the same violence 
that is evident within the larger cartels. Smaller groups in more areas are far harder to police 
which creates further instability (Schtulmann, 2013:3). Cartels vie for influence and control 
(see Figure 10) over the most valuable trafficking routes in the inland parts of the country 
which could affect states which have, up until now been exempt from violence such as 
Michoacán, Colima, Guanajuato, and Morelos (Red24, 2013b:7). The main cartels growing in 
stature and operating inland are Cartel de Jalisco and Knights Templar. According to 
Schtulmann (Personal interview 1, 7 August 2013), ―dynamics among Mexico‘s largest 
criminal organisations are at a crucial juncture that could generate more violence and criminal 
activity‖. With the presidency not as focused on eradicating drug trafficking, this could lead 
to big cartels like Los Zetas regaining influence in areas where previously it had lost its 
power. 
  
Figure 10: Drug cartel areas of influence in Mexico (Stratfor, 2013b) 
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A full-frontal assault on drug and drug-related violence was launched by former President, 
Felipe Calderon; however, the dramatic offensive by the government had an unwanted result 
and crime and violence levels soared. In response, cartels went on the offensive and fought 
back against the government. An aggressive approach towards curbing drug-related violence 
works to a degree as it succeeds in disrupting the cartel‘s activities and dynamics (Red24, 
2013b:7). However, it too comes with complications. Cartels respond by engaging in violent 
clashes with the security forces, and as cartels attempt to protect their revenue sources, they 
branch out their criminal activities. Between 2006 and 2012, more than 60,000 people died in 
drug-related violence (Norwegian Risk Consulting International, 2013). In March 2013 over 
1000 homicides were related to drug-related violence (see Figure 11) (Conroy, 2013). Since 
coming into power in 2012, President Peña Nieto has attempted a different approach, one that 
aims at finding the root causes of crime and curbing these, rather than following previous 
attempts of using pure force to deter crime. Solving the root causes though is set to be a 
serious challenge and one that will not remedy the situation quickly. President Peña Nieto 
also wants to shift the focus of the international community towards Mexico‘s economic 
growth potential and its reforms and away from the violence. This, along with President Peña 
Nieto‘s aim of reducing overall violence in Mexico by 50% in 2013 will be a vast challenge 
(Norwegian Risk Consulting International, 2013).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Homicides Related to Organised Crime (Conroy, 2013) 
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The suppression of drug related activities has led cartels to diversifying and using other 
criminal activities to bring in revenue. These activities extend to kidnapping, prostitution, 
retail drug sales and human trafficking. Similar to Nigeria, Mexican drug cartels have also 
resorted to oil theft to gain revenue (Harrup & Luhnow, 2011). This expansion of the drug-
cartels into other sectors presents a threat to public safety and security and as such, presents a 
political security risk to those TNOCs operating in the oil and gas industry in Mexico. The 
political risk comes with the lack of authority over organised crime (Personal interview 1, 7 
August 2013). 
4.4.2.2 Kidnapping and extortion 
With resources focused on combatting the drug cartels and related violence, attention is taken 
away from other crimes. As such, there is a lack of effective security in many Mexican cities 
and kidnappings and murders have increased (Stratfor, 2013c). Smaller criminal groups have 
taken the opportunity to conduct lucrative kidnapping and extortion operations while the 
focus has been on drug trafficking (Control Risks, 2013:91).  
Mexico was listed by Control Risks (2013:84) as the country with the second highest 
kidnapping rate in the world in 2012. Mexico had a reported 3000 kidnappings occur between 
January and September 2012 (Red24, 2013b:30). Mexico City, Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas, 
Chiapas and Durango are the worst affected states. Businesses operating in these areas are 
often prone to extortion from the cartels. If businesses fail to comply with the cartels‘ wishes, 
small-scale bombs are used in order to intimidate them. In Mexico, there is no specific type of 
victim and a variety of types of kidnapping occur; kidnapping for ransom, express 
kidnappings which involve abducting the victim and then driving to ATMs to withdraw 
money from their accounts, as well as virtual kidnappings which involve the perpetrators 
falsely claiming to have kidnapped the victim to receive a ransom (Stratfor, 2013c). 
Kidnapping presents a risk to TNOCs operating in the oil and gas industry in Mexico as 
personnel may be kidnapped for ransom. In May 2010 five workers from Pemex were 
kidnapped and a further 30 disappeared from the Burgos Basin in Tamaulipas (Wilkinson, 
2010). Drug cartel, Los Zetas, was implicated as the perpetrator. Their motive was unknown; 
however, events such as these force oil production to stop for a period of time, resulting in 
millions of dollars being lost in the process (Wilkinson, 2010). This risk will increase due the 
liberalisation of the energy sector and the influx of TNOCs into Mexican oil and gas regions. 
Drug-related activities are likely to be at the core, or smaller gangs identifying an opportunity 
to access money. 
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4.4.2.3 Energy reform 
President Peña Nieto has deemed essential reforms a priority for Mexico. These reforms relate 
to various spheres such as education and tax. Energy reform was one of the main points used 
by Peña Nieto in his 2012 Presidential campaign. Energy reforms look to liberalising the 
electricity sector, as well as restructuring the oil and gas industry and opening it up to foreign 
investment. Such foreign involvement is a key alliance to progress in an emerging market 
(Personal interview 1, 7 August 2013). Mexico has many unexplored oil regions and many 
areas in the Gulf of Mexico have not yet been developed. This provides great opportunities to 
TNOCs wanting to invest. The energy reforms will increase competition and aim to improve 
market conditions in Mexico (Schtulmann, 2013). Reforms such as these would never have 
been thought possible ten years ago, but political transition after the past elections has paved 
the way for new and much needed reforms.  
Mexico‘s energy sector is ailing. 40% of Mexico‘s gasoline is now imported and reforms in 
the oil and gas industry are necessary if Mexico does not want to become a net oil importer by 
as soon as 2018 (Norwegian Risk Consulting International, 2013). The Mexican oil sector 
was nationalised in 1938 and has been under the control and direction of Pemex for 75 years. 
Pemex has been the international face of energy self-sufficiency; however, it suffers from 
inefficiency and mismanagement. There is increasing oil instability and if reforms are not 
made, Pemex will lose its export power. Mexico potentially has vast amounts of oil reserves, 
but Pemex is in need of the expertise, funding and resources to discover these, which it does 
not have. As the Wilson Centre‘s Mexico Institute (in Thomson, 2013) points out, ―the 
current system has shown itself to be unable to respond to changing circumstances, and has 
left us on the brink of a disastrous decline in oil production and reserves‖. 
In October 2008 some oil sector reforms took place. This was the first step in trying to open 
the state-run oil and gas industry (BBC News, 2013a). These reforms allowed for foreign 
experts to sit on the Pemex administrative board, and looked towards bettering technology 
and long term strategies in order to help the oil sector become more efficient. The reforms 
also looked to the CNH with the goal of making it more independent and effective so more 
efficient regulation of the industry could occur. Along with this a few incentive-based 
contracts were awarded. For example, 20 blocks in the Tabasco State were tendered to 
international bidders in March 2011 (EIA, 2012b:3). These tenders did not give ownership of 
the land to the foreign companies; however, Mexico gained some needed technological 
enhancement. The major TNOCs now want more lucrative contracts opened to them in the 
Gulf of Mexico (EIA, 2012b:3). Serious reforms and changes have, up until recently been 
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continuously blocked by parliament, but some are vital to the growth and strength of the 
industry.  
President Peña Nieto has described the current reforms as being transformational and aim to 
maximise oil revenue and make the energy sector more efficient (Oprita, 2013). Reforming 
the oil and gas sector will improve the long-term growth potential of the industry as well as 
improve business competition (Thomson, 2013). The reforms will also bring about a fiscal 
change as they will diminish the government‘s dependence on Pemex. Reforms will also look 
to widen the tax base by moving tax reliance away from the oil and gas sector which presently 
contributes one-third of the federal budget (Norwegian Risk Consulting International, 2013). 
While the reforms will allow foreign private investment, Pemex will not be privatised and 
there will be no private oil concessions. Energy reforms will allow Pemex to retain more of its 
revenues and while the state will maintain ownership of the oil reserves, the TNOCs will be 
able to share in the profits (Norwegian Risk Consulting International, 2013). Perhaps the 
biggest change and most drastic step for Mexico in terms of reforms will be the altering of 
certain sections of its constitution. Presently the constitution states that exploration and 
extraction of oil in Mexico can only be conducted by Pemex (Thomson, 2013). Sections 25, 
27 and 28 of the Mexican constitution which relate to the structure of the oil and gas sector, 
will be rewritten to allow private investment. This constitutional change will provide TNOCs 
with legal certainty and clarity (Kerner & Hernandez, 2013).  
The conservative party PAN is likely to support the leading PRI, and the necessary two-thirds 
majority to secure the reforms approval will be gained. However, significant opposition will 
come from the left, as it is highly likely that the PRD will oppose these reforms, especially 
those relating to the changes in the constitution. According to Schtulmann (Personal interview 
1, 7 August 2013), this opposition from the PRD is a significant current political risk. Thus 
far the PRD have not shown support and will likely try to mobilise popular resistance against 
the reforms (Kerner & Hernandez, 2013). Along with this, it has been suggested that reforms 
are worthy if they can be transformative; however, establishment interests in Mexico may be 
too strong. After 75 years of state monopoly, it may take longer to hand over power to 
TNOCs. The PRI is known to have strong ties with certain sectors and is said to be ―entangled 
with the country‘s largest vested interests‖ (Sctulmann, 2012). If the PRI is not willing to 
back away from these interests and their views, then reforms are likely to be weak. An 
example of such vested interests and their power is that of the labour unions. A proposed 
labour reform looked to increase transparency and accountability in the unions; however, this 
proposed measure has since been disregarded by the PRI (Schtulmann, 2012). Weak energy 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
63 
 
reforms will only delay progress and economic growth, in a country that still has many 
systemic problems.  
4.4.2.4 Civil unrest 
Civil unrest is apparent in Mexico. The socio-economic gap in Mexico continues to widen 
and 40% of the population live below poverty line (Rubio, 2011). According to Schtulmann 
(Personal interview 1, 7 August 2013), one of the biggest political risks in Mexico at present 
is the growing disassociation between the average political citizen and the government. 
Protests will increase as the government is not able to offer the lower and middle income 
groups what they want. Social movements are one avenue where this dissatisfaction has found 
a voice (Personal interview 1, 7 August 2013), and there are growing dissident movements in 
Mexico. One such example is #YoSoy132, which is a radical youth movement. It aims to 
democratise Mexico focussing on the media. YoSoy132 have protested against electoral fraud 
and claim the media was favourably biased in its reporting of Peña Nieto during the 2012 
election campaign.  They also look towards generally challenging the traditional elite class 
system (Khan, 2013). The government will have to find a delicate balance between tolerating 
the various groups‘ sentiments as well as not employing too much force, as this could further 
empower the groups and their violent behaviour.  
There is growing dissent against the government along with mistrust of the PRI. At the 
inauguration of President Peña Nieto there were protests and riots. Protests occur regularly 
and these are held by groups seeking changes in government policy (US Embassy Mexico, 
2013). An example of such civil unrest was a protest held by teachers in August 2013. 
Parliament at the time was discussing a controversial education bill. The bill, which was 
approved by Mexican lawmakers, seeks reform by making teachers take tests annually to 
ensure their performance is up to standard. If the test is failed, that teacher would lose their 
job (BBC News, 2013a). The education reform looks to improve the quality and standard of 
education in Mexico. Teachers protested outside parliament in Mexico City, throwing rocks 
and fire bombs in the hope of disrupting the parliamentary session. Protestors shouted, ‗Out 
with Peña Nieto‘ and police were called in and used tear gas to disperse the crowds. Some 
protestors were arrested for attacking police officers (Khan, 2013). 
The Presidency vowed not to turn back on its decisions; however, this did not please the 
people, and teachers remained in protest outside the National Palace. The protestors also 
blocked access to the airport. The aggressive nature of the protest led to the postponement of 
President Peña Nieto‘s State of the Nation address (BBC News, 2013a). The address was 
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given on the 2
nd
 of September 2013 and the President provided a positive assessment of his 
administration so far. However, ―the new president is dealing with chaotic protests in the 
capital, intractable levels of violence and a less favourable economic outlook than predicted‖ 
(Khan, 2013). A preschool teacher Anna Allida Vazquez stated, ―first Peña Nieto goes after 
the teachers, next will be the country's oil and other valuable resources…The truth is he is 
going to sell our territory to foreigners and someone has to take a stand‖ (Khan, 2013). Such 
sentiment could have effects when foreign investment in the oil and gas industry does begin. 
TNOCs will have to guard their production sites as civil unrest could have a drastic effect.  
Furthermore, the population‘s frustration is growing with the continued drug-related violence 
as innocent civilians are put in danger. Drug-related violence is also leading to civil unrest. In 
some states police are incapable or reluctant to protect residents from the drug cartels and 
gangs. This has led to a growing movement of citizens taking up arms to protect themselves 
(Khan, 2013). This presents an aspect to consider for new TNOCs entering Mexico when 
reforms are signed in. Similar to the Niger Delta in Nigeria, local communities may 
disapprove of foreign entry and protests could occur. These stem from fundamental problems 
that find an outlet in protests against oil companies. 
4.4.2.5 Political instability 
Mexico is witnessing political instability. Being a federal country, Mexico lacks a strong 
central government (Rubio, 2011), and instability within the government is set to increase as 
protests grow against the proposed reforms. Political instability in Mexico has led to delayed 
decision making and weak cohesion within government. Furthermore, the government and 
President Peña Nieto have to deal with anti-PRI sentiment and fierce political opposition. 
While the PRI won 39% of the vote, 6.5% ahead of the closest rival, Obrador from the PRD, 
the PRI did not gain majority in congress. After the 2012 election, Obrador challenged the 
outcome and called for protests. This has led to tensions within government. Obrador is now 
forming a new political party, Movimiento Regeneracion Nacional (Morena). Morena as a 
party will be radically leftist and the introduction of a new political party will alter the 
political dynamic and lead to Mexico‘s political system being further fragmented 
(Schtulmann, 2012:2). PRD members have already joined Obrador, which gives the new party 
further sway. Such leftist values may have great success with the young voters and the party‘s 
dynamism will appeal to the youth movements.  The PRD, which until now has been seen as 
the face of the political left is going to have to review its values. It may move towards the 
centre; however, this could cost the party valuable votes (Schtulmann, 2012:2). 
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Political instability is also impacted by the drug cartels. The government is waging a war with 
the cartels and is struggling to contain drug-related violence (Control Risks, 2013:5). As such, 
the government‘s credibility has become a casualty of the drug war and the struggle against 
the cartels has left the judiciary and the law enforcement agencies severely strained. 
Regarding the oil and gas industry, the drug cartels activities towards the industry are 
paralysing oil production, and as Pemex is the government‘s largest income earner, this has an 
effect of government and its revenue. The government‘s reliance on oil revenue is also 
vulnerable to changes in the oil price. Changes in the price of oil along with continued oil 
theft and pipeline damage will decrease the government‘s revenue, which will further delay 
development and progress in Mexico. The country is still dealing with severe poverty and a 
widening socio-economic gap. With the remaining proposed reforms set to be signed in at the 
end of 2013, an economist in Mexico City, Luis de la Calle succinctly puts it, ―this 
government has the best chance in years to make progress, now they are going to have to start 
governing‖ (in Thomson, 2013). 
4.4.3 Conclusion 
It is a potentially exciting and prosperous time for TNOCs, as Mexico is undergoing structural 
changes which herald the dawn of allowing foreign investment in its oil and gas industry. 
There are political risks however that TNOCs should be aware of. The essential political risks 
which have been presented are: drug-related violence and organised crime, kidnapping and 
extortion, civil unrest, energy reform, and political instability. Drug related violence presents 
a vast challenge to Mexico and its government. Many criminal activities stem from this risk, 
one being kidnapping and extortion which remains extremely high. Civil unrest will increase 
as dissatisfaction with the government and its reforms continues. However, energy reformhas 
been a necessary step for Mexico to take and presently it is an interesting time for foreign 
investors looking towards investing in the Mexican oil and gas industry. Political instability is 
due mostly to political competition and is affected by drug-related activities. These political 
risks affect Mexico on a macro scale but also affect the oil and gas industry on the micro 
level.  
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4.5 Essential Political Risk Factors for the oil and gas industry in emerging 
markets 
4.5.1 Introduction 
When considering emerging markets and their behaviour, certain political risks need to be 
considered. These risks differ to those of developed markets. The oil and gas industry holds 
differing political risks to other industries. It therefore becomes important to consider those 
political risks before investing in an oil and gas industry in an emerging market. By looking at 
Nigeria‘s and Mexico‘s oil and gas industries and using these two countries as case examples 
of emerging markets, one is able to determine those political risk factors which cannot be 
ignored by TNOCs wanting to invest in the oil and gas industries in emerging markets. The 
political risk factor selection process was stated earlier in this chapter
23
. As can be noted from 
table one, six generic risk factors were selected. This study does not propose that these six 
factors are the only elements to be analysed when looking at investment in the oil and gas 
industry in emerging markets; however, they have emerged as essential generic risk factors.  
According to Schtulmann (Personal interview 1, 7 August 2013), everything stems from 
politics, including economic policies. Thus, for investors wanting to make financial 
investments, considering political risk is vitally important, especially in an emerging market 
where politics matters just as much as economics does. To see the potential of an investment 
and its economic viability, it is vital to look at the political situation. 
 
                                                          
23
 Refer to 4.2 Selection process of essential political risk factors 
Table 1: Generic Political Risk Factors for the oil and gas industry 
 in emerging markets 
1. Government Reform affecting the energy sector 
2. Political instability 
3. Kidnapping 
4. Internal violence 
5. Civil unrest 
6. Corruption 
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4.5.2.1 Government Reform affecting the energy sector 
Government reform affecting the energy sector is an essential political risk to consider when 
looking at investing in emerging markets. According to Schtulmann (Personal interview 1, 7 
August 2013), while reforms in developed markets occur on a micro level, reforms in 
emerging markets occur on a macro scale and their impact is greater as they deal with more 
fundamental issues, and the political and economic spheres are interlinked. A feature of 
emerging markets is the fact that their political institutions are still transforming (Personal 
interview 1, 7 August 2013). 
Government reforms can take many forms, for example host governments could enforce 
stricter labour regulations or apply punitive taxation. Further government reforms could relate 
to the changing of the legal framework of a country, such as statutory legal changes which 
impact the security of tenure for a TNOC. Reforms present a challenge as they may bring 
about changes in investor confidence and therefore a delicate balance needs to be struck. 
Government reform should aim at gaining popular approval as any changes in government 
policy or mention of reforms, especially regarding a country‘s resources tend to ignite a 
nationalist sentiment, which increases political risk and can affect the legitimacy of the 
regime (Brink, 2009: 84). Mining and petroleum operations ―tend to be the most sensitive of 
all international corporate activities because the resources involved are a country‘s national 
patrimony‖ (Alon et al., 2006:631). 
4.5.2.2 Political Instability  
Political instability has to do with government and their practices. Government stability is a 
measure of both the governments ―ability to carry out its declared polices, as well as its ability 
to retain office‖ (Brink, 2004:84). Issues such as changes in government, an authoritative 
administration and a lack of legitimacy, transparency and accountability all lead to political 
instability which makes the government ineffective and the state weak. Instability breeds a 
lack of law and order, poor governance, delayed decision making and growing discontent 
(Bremmer & Keat, 2009:283n.17). In the build-up to elections, instability can increase due to 
opposition tensions, fragmentation within the parties and election intimidation and violence as 
governments use undemocratic measures to retain power. Instability presents a political risk, 
as rather than an environment and situation where the country is resilient to shocks and 
responsive to challenges which investors want; investors are met with the opposite.  
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4.5.2.3 Kidnapping 
Kidnapping is a lucrative and established criminal enterprise which presents a threat to 
business operations (BBC News Africa, 2012). Emerging markets are prone to this criminal 
activity, with the most susceptible to kidnapping being ―those countries destabilised by 
conflict or where increases in foreign investment have not been supported by an enhanced 
security infrastructure‖ (Control Risks, 2013:83). While kidnapping takes on various forms 
such as express and virtual kidnapping, kidnapping for ransom is a political risk for TNOCs 
operating in the oil and gas industry in emerging markets. This offers an additional form of 
income for criminal groups, or can be seen as a form of protest against foreign firms operating 
in the oil and gas industry. Kidnapping for ransom is prolific in emerging markets, as seen in 
the cases of Nigeria and Mexico. Foreign companies are targets as companies are willing and 
able to pay the high ransom demand in order to ensure the safe return of their personnel. 
Kidnapping affects a TNOC negatively, as the effects of kidnappings include; business 
interruption, adverse publicity and financial losses (Stratfor, 2013c). 
4.5.2.4 Internal Violence 
Internal violence occurs due to varying reasons. Tensions caused by religious, social or ethnic 
divisions are some such causes. These tensions find an outlet in protest, vandalism, conflict 
and armed insurrection, and often have a political objective as people grow dissatisfied and 
their societal tensions grow due to the ineffectiveness of the government. Internal violence 
can be sporadic or sustained and in some cases can lead to a civil war, revolution or a coup 
d‘état occurring.  
Internal violence can be resource driven. Well-organised movements materialise in the form 
of rebel groups or terrorist organisations as seen by the rise of Islamist militancy in the north 
of Nigeria or the activities of MEND in the south of Nigeria. Such terrorist activities and 
violence present a threat to TNOCs operating in the oil and gas industry in emerging markets. 
Internal violence has the ability to disrupt production, damage property and in some instances, 
even lead to the operations being stopped. 
4.5.2.5 Civil Unrest 
Civil unrest occurs when the population becomes dissatisfied with their current situation and 
seeks change. This unrest is most often a symptom of socio-political problems and a growing 
discontent with the government as it fails to be responsive (Brink, 2004:85). This may be due 
to economic or social inequality, government suppression, injustice, slow economic growth, 
unemployment, or a lack of provision of basic public services such as healthcare (Brink, 
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2004:113). This dissatisfaction finds an outlet in civil unrest which can take the form of 
protests, occupations, sabotage and riots which lead to general disturbance. Civil unrest often 
begins with little or no warning and can present a political risk to TNOCs and their operations 
if the violence or popular protests extend to the TNOC‘s location.  Access to public areas may 
be halted, there may be destruction of infrastructure, and travel may become disrupted along 
with public services (US Embassy Mexico, 2013). 
4.5.2.6 Corruption 
Corruption occurs on various levels and affects various sectors and parties. Corruption as a 
political risk factor includes extortion, high and low level corruption and excessive patronage 
(Lambrechts et al., 2010:119). Corruption has a cumulative effect, for instance, petty 
corruption can grow to such an extreme that the government becomes ineffective in dealing 
with other problems and fails to provide basic services to the population (Bremmer & Keat, 
2009:20). An unstable environment caused by corruption leaves officials vulnerable to 
threats, a weak judiciary and greater intimidation, On a macro scale, corruption leads to a 
misuse of public resources and effects government as people gain power and prestige through 
patronage rather than ability (Brink, 2004:86). On a micro scale when looking at TNOC 
investment in the oil and gas industry, corruption can increase the cost of doing business in a 
country. With regards to TNOCs, corruption appears in the form of bribes, special payments, 
police protection, loans, and exchange controls (Brink, 2004:86). If a TNOC decides to 
partake in corrupt activities, possible corruption scandals could severely damage their 
reputation. The way companies go about conducting their business operations is increasingly 
being scrutinised and regulated. Companies need to guard their reputation and maintain a high 
ethical standard (Control Risks, 2013:9). 
4.6 Risk Mitigation in the oil and gas industry 
Political risk mitigation is the final step in political risk analysis and completes the political 
risk picture. As discussed in chapter two
24
, risk management according to Brink (2004:149) 
refers to, ―the sum of the actions foreign investors or MNCs take to try and keep at an 
acceptable level the degree or measure of investment risk associated with their activities‖. As 
such, risk mitigation can be seen as a part of risk management. Mitigation is a vital step in 
political risk analysis. If risk is high it does not necessarily mean that foreign companies 
should not invest. Political risk can in some instances be sufficiently managed and can 
subsequently lead to increased opportunities (Alon et al., 2006:624; Brink, 2004:156). 
                                                          
24
 Refer to 2.3.6. Risk management and mitigation 
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According to Control risks (2013:10), ―companies that align risk management with business 
development will remain at the forefront of integrity risk management‖. 
Investments made in the oil and gas industry reach billions of dollars, and such a large sum of 
capital means that risk mitigation is of paramount importance in order for a TNOC‘s assets, 
property, personnel and profit to be protected (Hough, 2008:5). As specific industries and 
firms face differing political risks, mitigation will also differ depending on the industry and 
the specific firm. The political risk mitigation strategy should therefore be tailored to suit the 
individual TNOC and a combination of risk mitigation techniques should be pursued (Lax, 
1983:177).  
Protective and integrative mitigation techniques were introduced in chapter two. Protective 
techniques aim at decreasing the severity of losses, while integrative techniques aim at 
bettering relations in the host country, and by doing so aim at reducing the occurrence of 
losses (Brink, 2004:156). Protective techniques such as, retaining full ownership and 
subcontracting aim at stopping host country interference or making sure steps are in place 
should such interference occur. Integrative techniques will look towards forming a stronger 
relationship between the TNOC and the host country. This can be done through local 
employment, creating close ties with the government and ensuring expatriate TNOC 
managers are made culturally aware. Both techniques have downfalls; if too protective the 
government may see the TNOC as hostile and want to interfere, and if too integrative, it can 
harm a TNOC‘s ability to compete efficiently (Brink, 2004:156). A combination of both 
techniques is superlative as a TNOC can maintain their competitive strong points while also 
grasping new opportunities and maintaining an effective relationship with the host 
government. 
Berlin et al. (2003) state the importance of political risk insurance. De facto insurance looks 
to the prevention of and protection from political risk. This may include entering into a JV 
with the host government or a local company, or hiring personnel from the local workforce. 
This correlates with the integrative techniques discussed by Brink (2004). Actual risk 
insurance assures that compensation will be received in the event of loss occurring. This 
insurance offers coverage for, to name a few; expropriation, war, trade disruption, and breach 
of contract. This insurance can be taken out with either a private company or through 
multilateral government programs such as the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA) which is part of the World Bank, or the United States Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC) (Berlin et al., 2003:4). It is best if these two types of insurance are used 
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together as they complement one another. A final note to consider regarding actual political 
risk insurance is that it will become void if a TNOC engages in unethical activities such as 
environmental contamination, corruption or bribery (Berlin et al., 2003:8). 
Further mitigation strategies according to the World Risk review (2013) include; firstly, going 
into JVs and maintaining equitable sharing of rewards as governmental participation and trust 
will help avoid expropriation threats. Here the importance of legal clarity is important. A 
senior oil executive from ExxonMobil remarked on the importance of ensuring that the 
contract that the host government originally signed with the TNOC is maintained, as well as 
making sure that the contract holds a stability clause (Personal interview 2, 16 August 2013). 
Secondly, there should be increased engagement with non-governmental stakeholders. These 
stakeholders have a better knowledge of the local surroundings, the community and their 
customs which will aid the TNOC in being accepted and hence will increase stability. Thirdly, 
a TNOC should look to building relationships with multilaterals such as the World Bank. 
They will be of help and service regarding legal clarity along with dispute resolution and 
arbitration provisions, should such a need arise. Fourthly, lobbyists can be employed who can 
aid TNOCs and ensure important decisions work in their favour, as well as show the host 
government the benefits they will receive if they deal with the TNOC (Wood, 2009:2). 
Further actions include; improving on-site security, maintaining a sound reputation, and using 
local suppliers.  
Mitigating micro political risk that is specific to the oil and gas industry in an emerging 
market is of paramount importance; however, a TNOC must not fail to consider and keep 
track of general political risks (Alon et al., 2006:639). Country-wide political risks are macro 
in scale such as the outbreak of a civil war. A TNOC has little control over country-wide 
political risks and hence these are harder to mitigate (Berlin et al., 2003:3). A senior oil 
executive from ExxonMobil remarked that the most suitable action is to track current events 
carefully and to keep in contact with the army and government officials. A further successful 
mitigation strategy for ExxonMobil has been avoidance. Such avoidance is reached by 
keeping production off-shore (Personal interview 2, 16 August 2013).  With regards to both 
industry-specific political risk as well as macro political risk, it is imperative to understand 
that risk is continuously changing and never remains static in a country. Political risk 
mitigation therefore will have to be adjusted, reformed and improved as the political risks that 
a TNOC faces change (Brink, 2004:30).  
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4.7 Conclusion 
Emerging markets provide an interesting outlook for growth and opportunity (Personal 
interview 1, 7 August 2013). However, many oil-rich states have volatile environments and 
this makes political risk analysis an invaluable tool when investing. This chapter offered a 
reflection on the essential political risks which need to be considered by TNOCs when 
looking at investment in the oil and gas industry in emerging markets. A comprehensive 
factor selection process was carried out. Thereafter Nigeria and Mexico were discussed and 
the political risk factors found in these case studies form the foundation for a generic risk 
index, which can serve as a basis for examining similar situations faced by TNOCs operating 
in the oil and gas industry in emerging markets in other parts of the world. A TNOCs‘ 
exposure to such political risks in emerging markets will depend on the TNOCs resources and 
capabilities (Frynas & Mellahi, 2003:548). Lastly this chapter provided a brief discussion on 
risk mitigation, which is the vital final step in a political risk analysis.  
Chapter five will conclude the study with an overview of the research study, looking at the 
progression of the study, followed by an evaluation of the research study in the context of the 
research question along with the aims and objectives of the study. The chapter will also look 
at recommendations for future research in the field of political risk. 
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CHAPTER FIVE – EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 
5.1 Introduction 
This research study began with the point raised by the Eurasia Group that emerging market 
risk differs to that of developed market risk, and that risk in some instances can be 
unbounded. Subsequently emerging markets were deemed a top risk for 2013. In emerging 
markets, ―politics matters at least as much as economics to market outcomes‖ (Eurasia Group, 
2013b). As such when looking at a country‘s economy, the potential for success and the 
possibility of investment, it becomes vitally important and necessary to look at the political 
situation. Globalisation has led to a changing global environment, one where emerging 
markets hold more influence in international affairs. Foreign investment in these emerging 
markets has been increasing, due in part to the fact that ―investments in emerging markets and 
developing markets generally provide higher rates of return than investments in developed 
states‖ (Bremmer & Keat, 2009:131). However, as the world is experiencing an increasingly 
unstable global environment, one which has brought with it new and unchartered challenges 
(Control Risks, 2013:9), the need for industry-specific political risk analysis in emerging 
markets is ever present. 
The objective of the research study was to discover the essential generic political risk factors 
that are present in the oil and gas industry in emerging markets, and therefore assist investors 
with risk identification, analysis and mitigation. Such objectives enable TNOCs to think about 
investment in the oil and gas industry in emerging markets in a clearer manner and by doing 
so, TNOCs will protect their assets and interests. Nigeria and Mexico proved to be relevant 
case studies of emerging markets that have notable oil and gas industries. This last chapter 
brings the research study to its conclusion by firstly giving a brief summation of the research 
study by looking at a progression of the study and what each chapter involved. Next an 
evaluation will be offered in light of the research questions, the objectives and the relevance 
of the research study. Thereafter recommendations for future research will be provided and 
lastly, a general conclusion to the research study will be given.  
5.2 Progression of the Research Study 
Chapter one offered a background to the research study. A brief literature review was 
provided which introduced the areas which the research study touched on; political risk, 
emerging markets, the oil and gas industry, and the case studies of Nigeria and Mexico. A 
discussion then followed in which the research problem was formulated and defined. The 
research design and methodology were then outlined, the limitations and delimitations 
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delineated and lastly, a chapter outline was provided, showing how the remainder of the 
research study would be structured.  
Chapter two had a dual aim as it provided not only the theoretical underpinning but also the 
necessary conceptualisations of the core terminology. The theoretical foundation to the 
research study was based on problem solving theory and rational choice theory. This provided 
this research study with a solid framework, which enabled a clearly defined point of departure 
for the remainder of the research study. Furthermore chapter two provided clarity as the core 
terminology and aspects of political risk relevant to the study were conceptualised. This 
enabled a concise definition of political risk to be arrived at. Furthermore, the chapter 
provided conceptualisations of emerging markets and the oil and gas industry.  
Chapter three offered a comparative contextualisation between Nigeria and Mexico. The 
case studies proved valuable, and suitable for analysis. Both countries are part of the N-11
25
 
and are considered by O‘Neill (2011) to have young and expanding populations, strong 
market growth, positive economic performance, and immense financial opportunities. Both 
emerging markets also have globally recognised and notable oil and gas industries. Oil forms 
the fiscal basis on their economies and provides the majority of government revenue. For 
Nigeria, oil accounts for 70%, while in Mexico oil accounts for 34% of government revenue 
(IMF, 2013). The comparative contextualisation between Nigeria and Mexico enabled one to 
gain a deeper understanding of not only the countries overall, but also their oil and gas 
industries, as well as emerging market behaviour overall. Chapter three provided an apt 
foundation from which to move towards discovering the main political risk factors that were 
discussed in chapter four.   
Chapter four highlighted, through a careful factor selection process, the essential generic 
political risk factors that are present in the oil and gas industry in emerging markets. This 
chapter provided an outlet through which reflection on political risk could occur. Firstly the 
political risks apparent in the oil and gas industries in Nigeria and Mexico were highlighted. 
For Nigeria these political risk factors were: government reforms, civil war, political 
instability, social tensions, corruption and kidnapping. For Mexico these political risk factors 
were: drug related violence, kidnapping and extortion, energy reform, civil unrest and 
political instability. By using Nigeria and Mexico as case studies of emerging markets and 
discussing the salient political risks they display, a generic list of the essential political risks 
that affect the oil and gas industry in emerging markets was determined. These six political 
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risks are those that investors should be aware of when looking to invest in the oil and gas 
industry in emerging markets and they are: government reform affecting the energy sector, 
political instability, kidnapping, internal violence, civil unrest and corruption. Lastly political 
risk mitigation was briefly looked at and discussed. This is the vital final step in political risk 
analysis and discussing mitigation allowed for a more comprehensive research study.  
5.3 Evaluation of the Research Study  
The purpose of this research study was to look at political risk in emerging markets and to 
compile a generic list of risk factors. Emerging markets served as the principal concept which 
drove the generic list. As a sub-category the case studies of Nigeria and Mexico were utilised 
to complete the list of generic risk factors, within the context of the oil and gas industry.  
Being aware of these essential generic political risk factors will better enable TNOCs to think 
about investment in the oil and gas industry in emerging markets, in a clearer manner. 
Furthermore this study will aid investors with risk identification, analysis and mitigation. 
Nigeria and Mexico as emerging markets worked well as the chosen case studies and proved 
to be successful for this research study. Nigeria has a prominent oil and gas industry and has 
demonstrated its emerging market power. Mexico is of current relevance owing to the energy 
reforms that are due to be passed by the end of 2013. Mexico‘s oil and gas industry has been 
state-run since 1938 and the current reform looks toward liberalising the sector and allowing 
greater foreign involvement and as such, provides great scope for investment.  
The central research question was; ‗What are the main political risks facing investors who 
want to participate in the oil and gas industry in emerging markets?’ This was achieved 
through the aid of the sub-questions; ‘What are the main political risk factors for TNOCs 
operating in the Niger Delta’ and ‘what are the main political risk factors for TNOCs 
operating in the Gulf of Mexico?’ These sub-questions were answered by gaining information 
regarding political risks in Nigeria and Mexico and seeing how they applied on three levels: 
the emerging market level, the national level and more specifically, the oil and gas industry. 
Once the main political risk factors for both Nigeria and Mexico had been determined and 
discussed, a generic list for emerging markets could be established by seeing which political 
risk factors correlated between the two case studies and their lists of political risk factors. 
Determining the main political risk factors came from a careful factor selection process
26
 
through the use of reputable sources and risk reports. A variety of steps were taken to ensure 
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that the essential factors were found and highlighted
27
. The generic list provides investors 
with the most salient political risks facing an oil and gas industry in an emerging market. The 
third research question, ‘How can political risk in the oil and gas industry be mitigated? 
provided a more complete picture of political risk as it dealt with the last aspect of political 
risk analysis and the final step investors need to look at. This was answered through 
consulting highly-regarded literature on risk mitigation.  
The use of secondary data proved sufficient for answering the research questions. However, 
the addition of some primary data gained from Skype interviews with the President of Empra 
regarding Mexico, as well as a senior oil executive from ExxonMobil regarding Nigeria was 
extremely beneficial to the study. The information gained provided deeper insight into the 
case studies and industry-specific political risk in the oil and gas industry. The use of primary 
data improved the quality of the research as it supplemented and supported the secondary 
data. The empirical and inductive nature of the research study proved effective as it allowed 
ideas to be formed and changed as the study progressed and evolved. This allowed for a 
process of continued learning.  
The research study succeeded in being exploratory as it determined the main political risk 
factors that need to be measured when wanting to invest in the oil and gas industry in 
emerging markets. It was descriptive in the way that the research study created a picture of 
political risk in emerging markets, the essential political risk factors, as well as the situation in 
the oil and gas industries in Nigeria and Mexico. It was also explanatory as looked at the links 
between political risk and emerging markets, specifically by using the cases of Nigeria and 
Mexico as emerging markets and focussing on industry-specific risk in the oil and gas 
industry. The research study has contributed to existing literature and will assist investors in 
the way they go about investment in the oil and gas industry in emerging markets. 
This evaluation will now turn to look at the limitations and delimitations of the research 
study, and aspects that could have been improved. Firstly, political risk is a complex and 
wide-ranging discipline with various definitions. This was overcome by arriving at an 
informed conceptualisation of political risk after analysing a wide range of definitions. This 
created a strong framework from which to work from. Political risk can be highly subjective. 
Deeming the generic political risk factors from a range of data was a subjective exercise; 
however, the study did not suggest that the six factors were the only elements that need to be 
investigated when looking at investment in the oil and gas industry in emerging markets. 
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However, they are important generic risk factors. Furthermore, there was no use of field 
research. However, the use of reliable data and the input from expert primary sources aided 
this exercise and enhanced the research. Further use of primary data would have led to an 
even greater understanding of the intricacies of political risk in the oil and gas industry in 
emerging markets. Such a limitation reveals the need to combine reliable secondary sources 
with more expert analyses. Combining such information creates a more objective political risk 
assessment and provides one with a sufficiently deeper understanding of the challenges faced 
by TNOCs operating in the oil and gas industry in emerging markets.  
Initially it appeared that the challenge would be finding enough suitable and relevant data 
regarding Mexico. Not only has the energy sector been state-run and owned since 1938, and 
thus finding public information would be hard, but the main language in Mexico is Spanish, 
hence much of the necessary literature would be in Spanish.  This did not prove to be 
problematic as there was enough reliable and credible data available and the texts were 
predominantly English. The interview with the President of EMPRA too aided the gaining of 
resources as he emailed through additional data.  
In summary, oil and gas are of strategic importance for a country. They supply the 
government with revenue and inspire nationalist sentiment. Furthermore, oil is a driver of the 
global economy, as ―in literal and figurative senses, petroleum fuels the world economy‖ 
(Lax, 1983:85). Along with this is the current focus on emerging markets, their behaviour and 
their ‗unbounded‘ risk.  In emerging markets, politics and economics are extremely 
interlinked, making the interplay between emerging markets and political risk dynamic, 
especially in volatile industries such as the oil and gas industry. The above mentioned facts 
make this research study extremely current and relevant and show the need for industry-
specific political risk analysis of emerging markets. Furthermore, the research study has 
provided TNOCs with realistic political risks and practical advice. 
5.4 Recommendations for further research 
This research study looked at industry-specific political risk in emerging markets and 
contributed to the wider discussion relating to political risk analysis. Focussing on the 
petroleum sector is of great relevance to the subject, especially as the demand for energy 
sources grows and the search for new hydro-carbon areas intensifies. Along with this, 
political risk analysis is an invaluable tool for an investor considering entering the oil and gas 
industry in an emerging market. Political risk is a dynamic and interdisciplinary field and new 
developments are continually appearing and informing the theory of political risk analysis. 
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―Political risk seamlessly bridges the boundaries between the academic and the practical, 
bringing political theories out of the realm of observation and examination, and into the real 
world. It is a field that has the ability to focus years of training in political theory, in a precise 
way, in a growing industry of political risk practitioners and analysts‖ (Boschoff, 2010:96). 
Political risk has a wide scope and combining various methods will aid the political risk 
discipline.  
There are many avenues open for further research, as quality industry-specific research is 
lacking in areas of the political risk field, such as that concerning emerging markets and their 
behaviour. Research focusing on industry-specific political risk in emerging markets can be 
expanded on. The first recommendation relates to the type of research. The use of field 
research would enhance this research topic as more quality primary data could be gained. 
Furthermore, field research would form an integral part for research conducted on a PHD 
level. The opportunity to speak to and gather information from local communities, foreign 
personnel operating on the ground, politicians, the media, the police, NGOs in the area, along 
with TNOC executives and political risk analysts would be of great significance and enhance 
the research study. Interviewing a diverse range of subjects would be insightful and show 
more clearly the inner workings of industry-specific political risk in emerging markets.  
Furthermore, this research study only looked at the oil and gas industry in the context of 
emerging markets. The second recommendation is that additional case studies could be used, 
expanding the research to other continents. The nine other countries from the N-11 could 
provide further case studies of emerging markets. These are: Vietnam, South Korea, Iran, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Philippines and Turkey. From this list, Iran, 
Vietnam, Indonesia and Pakistan have oil and gas industries. Related to this point is a third 
recommendation, that other industries in emerging markets could be looked at, thus forming 
more quality research on industry-specific political risk in emerging markets. Examples of 
further studies are: the electronics industry in South Korea, the agricultural industry in 
Vietnam, the apparel manufacturing industry in Pakistan, or the tourism industry in Indonesia. 
Micro risk analysis is under-researched and with political risk analysis being such a diverse 
and wide-ranging discipline, there is a need for more industry-specific quality research. By 
looking at other emerging markets as well as other industries in the same manner, a valuable 
contribution to the field would be made. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
This research study has contributed to the greater discussion regarding political risk analysis, 
and has highlighted the need for further industry-specific studies, especially those in emerging 
markets. Due to globalisation, emerging markets have become more dominant and influential 
due to their dynamism and size. They too, have become more attractive to foreign investors. 
However, the political environment is continually changing and subsequently is changing the 
conditions under which TNOCs operate. This is especially apparent in the oil and gas 
industries in resource rich emerging markets. As the demand for energy sources continues to 
climb, government reforms continue to evolve, and there is increased competition worldwide, 
therein rests great potential and interesting business outlooks for foreign investors. However, 
while emerging market power continues to intensify and the opportunities they offer continue 
to grow, investment in emerging markets does come with its share of risk and this risk can be 
unbounded. In an increasingly volatile world, with greater uncertainty surrounding 
investments and potential returns, the need for political risk analysis is immense. 
Understanding industry-specific political risk in emerging markets allows TNOCs to enter 
uncertain and at times volatile environments and remain there; taking full advantage of the 
opportunities they offer.  
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